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Abstract
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis (Chapters 1 to 4), we analyze the near-universal
gender gap reversal in secondary and tertiary education. In virtually all
countries, males show a greater dispersion in ability test scores relative to
females. We show that this simple fact, combined with an increase in the
returns to education across cohorts, is suﬃcient to reproduce the gender
gap reversal observed internationally. We bould a model that generates a
hump-shaped relationship between the enrollment rate in education and the
female-to-male ratio among the enrolled that is consistent with the data.
From time-series data on enrollment rates in education by sex, we gener-
ate country estimates for gender diﬀerences in ability distribution using our
model. Our estimates highly correlate with cross-country gender diﬀerences
in test score distributions found in PISA. We also assess the validity of our
theory against two alternative explanations for the gender gap dynamics:
changes in social norms, and improvements in females' relative performance
at school over time. The data does not support the predictions of the alter-
native hypotheses, while bringing further support to our theory.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 5), using Finnish high school
data, I examine the relationship between peer composition and the causal
eﬀect of school choice on high school exit examination outcomes. To discern
the causal eﬀect of school choice, I exploit over 300 regression discontinu-
ity designs that result naturally from the Finnish educational system that
allocates pupils to high schools according to their ninth grade grade point
average and announced preferences. I ﬁnd strong evidence that high school
choice matters in Finland and that it is related to peer composition. The
class composition eﬀect, however, is associated with peer homogeneity rather
than average peer quality. I ﬁnd that a standard deviation change in the
homogeneity of peers is positively associated with a 0.02 to 0.13 standard
deviation change in the exam results. I also ﬁnd that the average eﬀect of
being marginally above the entrance threshold reduces slightly but signiﬁ-
cantly the performance of the pupil. This unexpected ﬁnding might be a
sign of overconﬁdence on the part of the pupils in making their school choice.
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Preface
Questions pertaining to education are relevant to the ﬁeld of economics for a multitude
of reasons. The most cited reason is probably economists' interest in the accumulation
of human capital. We want to know how inputs in to education aﬀect the outputs.
Education is also a relevant factor in questions of gender equality. The two sexes'
opportunities to obtain education and the realized diﬀerences in educational attainment
are important factors in determining many gender related outcomes. In this doctoral
thesis, I explore these two dimensions of the economics of education.
The thesis is divided in to two parts. The ﬁrst part of the thesis (Chapters 1
to 4) is co-authored with Laurent Bossavie and it aims to tackle questions related to
the observed near-universal gender gap reversal in secondary and tertiary education
and in it we present a new framework for studying the educational gender gap. The
framework allows us to present the diﬀerent theories in a formal and exact manner and
compare their prediction with empirical facts. We also present and assess a new theory
for the educational gender gap dynamics over the last 40 years, which is based on the
larger variability of males' test score distribution relative to females. We show that the
theory is consistent with empirical data, and cannot be dismissed. We also showed that
alternative theories proposed by the literature are unable, alone, to explain some of the
patterns observed in the data. Meanwhile, our theory appears to be able to replicate
all the main patterns observed in the data.
In Chapter 1 (Gender Inequality in Educational Outcomes: The Facts), we present
four international facts about the gender gap in educational attainment. We show
that these facts are near-universal and observed in the very large majority of countries,
including developing countries. We report that most countries have nowadays a female
majority in tertiary education, and that in all these countries the gender gap has reversed
over time from male majority. Further, we show that there exists a similar gender gap
in secondary school non-completion rates in most countries, and that it has reversed
from female majority to male majority over the last decades. Although the college
gender gap reversal has been noted in the literature for the US and some other western
countries, we are the ﬁrst to show that it applies internationally. To our knowledge,
iii
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we are also the ﬁrst contribution to observe the analogous gender gap reversal in high
school non-completion rates.
In Chapter 2 (Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in Educational Outcomes: A Statistical
Theory), we present a new theoretical framework for studying the relationship between
enrollment rates and gender ratios in enrollment. The framework combines an optimal
choice model of education, in which the agents' choice of educational level is a function of
their test-taking ability, with diﬀerent underlying distributions of test-taking ability for
males and females. In particular, males exhibit higher variability in abilities, including
test-taking ability. The female-to-male gender ratio in enrollment is presented as a
function of the enrollment rate, some characteristics of the test-taking abilities of females
and males and the possibly gender-speciﬁc changes in the entrance requirements. The
fundamentally diﬀerent aspect of the framework is that the enrollment rate is given a
prominent role.
Our third contribution (in Chapter 3, Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in Educational
Outcomes: Fitting and Testing the Theory) is to show that we are able to capture
the essential dynamics of gender diﬀerences in educational outcomes. In particular, our
novel framework allows us to predict the gender gap reversal at both the university level
and high school level internationally. This is the ﬁrst time there has been an eﬀort to
understand the college gender gap reversals in educational fortunes of boys and girls at
the international level. It is also the ﬁrst theory to explain the reversal in high school
non-completion rates. Chapter 3 shows that our theory for the internationally observed
facts about gender inequality in education is consistent with the data, and cannot be
dismissed as an potential explanation for the educational gender gap dynamics.
Finally, Chapter 4 (Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in Educational Outcomes: Evalu-
ating Alternative Hypotheses) shows that alternative theories proposed by the literature
are inconsistent with some of the patterns observed in the data. Using the framework
we develop in Chapter 2, we formalize the two main alternative explanations to the
gender gap dynamics: changes in social norms and an increase in females' mean perfor-
mance in tests. By doing so, we are able to compare the predictions of these alternative
hypotheses with the ones given by our theory in a common framework, and to confront
them with empirical data. We propose and perform several tests for these two alterna-
tive hypotheses using empirical data. While our theory is not rejected by these tests,
all of them dismissed the change in social norms hypothesis as the main driving force
between the gender gap dynamics.
The policy implications of this body of work (Chapters 1 to 4) are not obvious.
Rather, the insights gained in this analysis would suggest that one should tread carefully
when drawing conclusions from results showing that social norms are a major factor
iv
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behind most observed gender diﬀerences in educational outcomes. We believe that the
framework presented here could be useful in future analyses of educational outcomes.
Also, our work suggests that one should be careful when drawing policy conclusions
about the diﬀerences in male and female high school non-completion rates. Those
diﬀerences might be due to tail eﬀects or diﬀerences in the means of the distributions.
Policy responses should be sensitive to this fact.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 5), using Finnish high school data, I study
the relationship between peer composition and the causal eﬀect of school choice on high
school exit examination outcomes, a ﬁeld that has been studied before. However, I
use novel and more accurate data than most previous authors, since I know the exact
preferences of the high school applicants. To discern the causal eﬀect of school choice, I
exploit over 300 regression discontinuity designs that result naturally from the Finnish
educational system that allocates pupils to high schools according to their ninth grade
grade point average and announced preferences. Although Finland oﬀers a relatively
egalitarian setting for high school students at least in terms of expenditures per student
and student quality before high school, the result from this paper is that school choice
does matter and that it appears to stem partly from class composition. The class
composition eﬀect, however, is associated with peer homogeneity rather than average
peer quality. I ﬁnd that a standard deviation change in the homogeneity of peers is
positively associated with a 0.02 to 0.13 standard deviation change in the exam results.
The evidence suggests that on average the students who are at the threshold are worse
oﬀ getting in to their favored school than the control group that just missed their ﬁrst
preference, although the former group gets better-achieving and more homogenous peers
on average. I propose the working hypothesis that the high-aiming applicants might
actually be overconﬁdent in the application process. They apply for a school that will
be ultimately harmful for them, since the teaching is aimed at students that are on
average better-achieving.
v
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1Gender Inequality in Educational
Outcomes: The Facts
with Laurent Bossavie
1.1 Introduction
There has been surprisingly little focus on presenting stylized facts about gender in-
equality in education1. This is an important gap in the literature as gender diﬀerences
in education might help to understand gender inequality in other areas, in particular on
the labour market. In addition, the gender gap in educational outcomes has changed
signiﬁcantly over the past decades, as we will show. Some of these changes are partly
unknown to economists, and may raise important questions regarding the underlying
forces behind these dynamics. The ﬁrst two stylized facts presented in this chapter deal
with the upper tail of the educational achievement distribution, while the third and
fourth facts refer to the lower tail of the distribution. In this chapter, we focus on the
ﬂow as opposed to stock measurement of human capital to capture most recent trends
in gender inequality in education. We are interested in the contribution of incoming
cohorts to the stock of human capital. On the other hand, stock measures of human
capital are less sensitive to recent changes in gender representation.
1One recent exception is Pekkarinen (2012).
1
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1. GENDER INEQUALITY IN EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: THE
FACTS
1.2 The Gender Gap in Participation to Tertiary Education
1.2.1 Existence
There exists evidence showing that women outnumber men among university students in
some countries 1. In this chapter, we exploit new data to extend and establish this fact
over a wider array of countries. Our data is from the Barro-Lee database (2010), which
reports participation rates in tertiary education by gender and cohort of birth for more
than 140 countries. It is in that sense a ﬂow measure of human capital as it measures
the contribution of incoming cohort by gender to the existing stock or human capital,
and therefore captures latest gender-speciﬁc changes educational participation decisions.
The female-to-male ratios among tertiary educated students reported in Figure 1.3 are
from 2010, for cohorts born between 1976 and 19812. Reported ﬁgures are computed
as the ratio between the percentage of females having attended tertiary education by
age 30 in 2010, over the percentage of males having attended tertiary education by age
30. It shows that women outnumber men among participants to tertiary education in
virtually all OECD countries: in 26 out of 32 OECD countries, the female-to-male ratio
is higher than 1, meaning that participation rates to tertiary education are higher for
females than for males. The gender gap in tertiary education participation is particu-
larly large in Northern European countries such as Finland, Iceland, Estonia or Latvia.
Among non-OECD countries, the gap is the largest in Slovenia with a female-to-male
ratio close to 1.9.
Importantly, the ﬁgure for non-OECD countries shows that this phenomenon is not
restricted to most advanced economies. Females also outnumber males among partic-
ipants to tertiary education in the large majority of developing countries: 29 out of
40 non-OECD countries. In Latin American countries such as Uruguay, Venezuela or
Argentina, women also outnumber males by a large margin in tertiary education, with
a female-to-male ratio larger than 1.8 in these 3 countries. Women are also in large
majority among participants to tertiary education in ex-communist countries such as
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria or Lithuania. There exists a few notable exceptions to female
dominance in participation to tertiary education among advanced economies. In South
Korea, Switzerland and Germany, males are still the majority among participants to
tertiary education, although the ratio is very close to one in Germany. Among OECD
1See, for example, Becker et al.(2010) or Pekkarinen (2012).
2The Barro-Lee dataset does not report participation rates at university for year-by-year cohorts
of birth but for 5-year band birth cohorts
2
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1.2 The Gender Gap in Participation to Tertiary Education
countries, Turkey has the lowest female-to-male ratio among participants to tertiary ed-
ucation with a ratio of approximately 0.65. Apart from these few exceptions, the larger
participation of females to tertiary education can be qualiﬁed as a quasi-universal phe-
nomenon among industrialized economies.
Figure 1.1: Female-to-Male Ratio among Individuals who Attended Tertiary Education
by Age 30 - 2010
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Source: Barro-Lee database 2010.
1.2.2 Reversal
One can gain further insights on the gender gap in higher education by looking at
its dynamics over time. There exists solid evidence showing that, while men used
to outnumber women among participants to higher education, females' participation
rates progressively converged towards male levels before surpassing them during the
last decades. For the US, several papers have reported a convergence, followed by a
reversal in the percentage of women relative to men attending university education
over the period 1960-2010 1. While most work in this respect has been conﬁned to
the US, we complement this evidence by showing that the reversal of the gender gap in
participation to tertiary education is a phenomenon shared by the very large majority of
developed countries2. In addition, we show the gender gap reversal in tertiary education
participation is not conﬁned to advanced economies, and is also observed in a large
1See, for example, Goldin et al. (2006) or Becker et al. (2010)
2Pekkarinen (2012) shows that this phenomenon is also observed in Northern European countries
3
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
1. GENDER INEQUALITY IN EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: THE
FACTS
number of developing countries. In order to reconstruct the evolution of participation
rates to tertiary education by gender and cohort of birth, we used data from the Barro-
Lee (2010) dataset. The dataset allows constructing the fraction of individuals of a given
5-year band cohorts having attended university by the year of 35, from individuals born
in 1891 to 1971.
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1.2 The Gender Gap in Participation to Tertiary Education
Figure 1.2: Female-to-Male Ratio among Individuals Having Attended University - by
Birth Cohort
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It can be seen from Figure 1.3 than the reversal occurred for virtually all indus-
trialized countries: while males used to outnumber females in participation rates to
university, females gradually became the majority over time. The timing of the reversal
however varies across countries: while the percentage of women attending higher educa-
tion was already higher than men in Poland and Bulgaria in the early 1970s, the reversal
occurred at the beginning of the 1990s in the UK. It is also a very recent phenomenon in
countries like Austria, Japan, and the Netherlands. Following the reversal, the gender
gap in university attendance appear to have increased in all countries in the favor of
women, before stabilizing in recent years. Interestingly, the reversal also occurred in
Tunisia in the early 2000s, in spite of relatively low rates of university attendance. In
Turkey, on the other hand, the reversal did not occur, in spite of a slow convergence
of women's participation rate towards men's participation. More surprisingly, South
Korea, Switzerland and Germany are important exceptions to the gender gap reversal
phenomenon among advanced economies: the reversal did not occur in spite of a sharp
increase in university attendance rates over the last decades. Strikingly, the reversal
occurred in less advanced economies such as Saudi Arabia.
1.3 The Gender Gap in Secondary School Non-Completion
1.3.1 Existence
In this section, we establish the fact that males outnumber females among low edu-
cational achievers internationally. As compulsory education ends at the end of lower
secondary school in most developed countries, one particular way to identify individ-
uals belonging to the lower end of the educational achievement distribution is to look
at individuals who did not complete upper-secondary education, whether they started
it or not. Those individuals are typically referred to in the literature as secondary
school non-completers, or high school non-completers. Figure 1.3 reports the upper
secondary school non-completion rates by gender in 2010, from the Barro-Lee database.
It shows that the over-representation of males among high school non-completers ap-
pears to be a phenomenon shared by virtually all OECD countries. Among the 28
countries for which secondary school non-completion rates are reported 1, 23 countries
have a female-to-male ratio of non-completers below one, and only two have a ratio
signiﬁcantly larger than one. Males are highly represented among secondary school
non-completers in Northern European countries such as Iceland, Finland or Norway.
1We only include countries with non-completion rates between 0.1 and 0.9. The countries in the
extremes are likely to have more estimation error due to small numbers of non-completers or completers,
respectively.
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1.3 The Gender Gap in Secondary School Non-Completion
The female-to-male ratio of secondary school non-completers is also particularly low
in Slovakia and Japan, where females represent less than half of the total number of
secondary school non-completers. At the other extreme, Austria is a notable exception
to higher non-completion rates of males among OECD countries. It is the only OECD
country, with Turkey, in which females are in large majority among secondary school
non-completers, with a female-to-male ratio of approximately 1.5. Importantly, the
predominance of males among secondary school non-completers is not a phenomenon
restricted to advanced economies, and is also observed in the majority of developing
countries. Among non-OECD countries for which the data was available, the female-
to-male ratio among non-completers is lower than 1 for 23 out of 36 countries. Even in
some countries where social norms would a priori not favor women's education, such as
Saudi Arabia, males outnumber females among secondary school non-completers.
Figure 1.3: Female-to-Male Ratio among Secondary School Non-Completers
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Source: Barro-Lee database 2010.
1.3.2 Reversal
It is often assumed that the over-representation of males among dropouts is also an his-
torical phenomenon. Interestingly, the cohort analysis reported in Figure 1.4 reveal that
males have not always outnumbered females among upper-secondary school dropouts.
We combined data from various data sources in order to reconstruct the evolution of the
fraction of secondary school dropouts by gender and birth cohort for the main indus-
trialized countries. We were able to compute upper secondary school dropout rates for
birth cohorts over 90 years, ranging from individuals from in 1891 to individuals born in
7
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1981. The main source for the data is the Barro-Lee database (2010), which allows us
to compute secondary school non-completion rates for 5-year band cohorts from 1891,
and separately for males and females. The European Union Labour Force Survey was
also used as a complementary source. Figure 1.4 shows that virtually all countries share
similar dynamics: while females were slightly more represented among upper-secondary
school non-completers in the oldest cohorts, the female-to-male ratio ﬁrst increased
before decreasing sharply among younger cohorts. Virtually all the graphs reported
for individual countries shows a point at which the female-to-male ratio among non-
completers crosses the y = 1 line, indicating the reversal of the gender gap in secondary
school non-completion from female majority to male majority. The progressive overtake
of males among secondary school non-completers over time is analogous to the overtake
observed for females in tertiary education enrollment rates presented in Section 1.
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1.3 The Gender Gap in Secondary School Non-Completion
Figure 1.4: Female-to-Male Ratio among Secondary School Non-Completers - By Birth
Cohort
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1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented four facts about the educational achievements of the two
genders. We showed that all these facts are near-universal. Also, it appears that there
is something congruent between the gender gap reversal in university attendance, and
the reversal in secondary school non-completion rates. Two main theories have been
proposed to account for the gender gap reversal in participation to tertiary education.
The two facts we present about high school non-completion rates have not, however,
been accounted for by previous literature. Focusing on the US, Chiappori et al. (2009)
invoked the progressive removal of social barriers to women's education, combined with
higher returns to tertiary education for women, as an explanation for the gender reversal
in college attendance. Cho (2007) proposed another explanation, again using US data.
He argued that the improvement of women's preparation to university proxied by high
school test scores are an important driving force behind the gender gap dynamics in
education.
The framework that we will establish in the following chapters allows us to present
our new theory and the existing theories in a formal setting. Using this framework,
we show that our theory is consistent with the four near-universal facts we presented.
It is also compatible with the two other theories proposed by the literature, and the
truth is likely to contain parts from each one. The new theory we present is based on
the larger variability of males' test score distribution relative to females. This fact is
strongly supported by empirical data, and like the phenomena we intend to explain, has
been shown to be near-universal. We explore this explanation in the following chapters
where we present out theoretical framework and test our theory against empirical data.
We will argue that it provides a credible explanation to the gender gap dynamics in
education that cannot be dismissed by the data. We will also show that some predictions
of previous theories can be falsiﬁed through empirical testing, casting doubt on their
ability to explain, alone, the gender gap reversal in education.
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2Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in
Educational Outcomes: A
Statistical Theory
with Laurent Bossavie
2.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes an explanation for the simultaneous reversal of the gender gap in
university attendance and high school non-completion rates observed internationally. As
shown in Chapter 1, while there was a majority of men enrolling into tertiary education
at the beginning of the 1970s, women's participation to university gradually converged
and overtook men's participation over the last decades. This stylized fact was ﬁrst
established for the US by previous literature, and we show in Chapter 1 that it is
actually a near universal phenomenon observed in virtually all advanced economies,
and in the large majority of developing countries. Symmetrically, we report a similar
reversal for secondary school non-completers: while women used to outnumber males
among secondary school non-completers, males progressively became majoritary as non-
completion rates decreased over time. To our knowledge, this reversal in the gender
gap among secondary school non-completers has not been put forward so far in the
literature. Explaining the gender gap reversal in education is interesting in its own
right, but also for eﬃciency purposes. First, understanding the origins of the gender
gap in education might help understanding gender inequality in other areas, in particular
on the labour market. In addition, it is important to identify whether observed gender
diﬀerences in educational outcomes result from ineﬃciencies, or optimal behaviors. In
particular, one would like to know whether those outcomes originate from discrimination
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between genders, or from optimizing behaviors based on fundamental gender diﬀerences
in preferences, behaviors, or ability distributions.
To account for these two quasi-universal facts, we start from a simple Card model of
optimal investment in human capital, in which the optimal length of education chosen
by individuals is increasing in test-taking ability, measured by test scores. In this
framework, we show that a higher variance of test scores for males relative to females,
combined with an increase over time in the net beneﬁts of university attendance for
both genders, are suﬃcient to reproduce the empirical dynamics of the educational
gender gap. In particular, our model is able to generate a relationship between the
total enrollment rate and the female-to-male ratio among the enrolled that provides
a very accurate ﬁt for the data. In a similar way, it also allows us to reproduce the
relationship between secondary school non-completion rates and gender ratio among
non-completers observed empirically.
Several contributions have previously attempted to explain the gender gap reversal
in university attendance, focusing on the US context. Goldin et al. (2006) invoke
the removal of past barriers to womens' education and careers, combined with a higher
college wage premium for women, as an explanation for this stylized fact over the period
19702010. In a similar way, Chiappori et al. (2009) combine an exogenous fall in the
time required for housework with higher labor-market returns to schooling for women
to explain the relative rise in womens' university education. Both contributions rely
on higher returns to higher education for women to generate the gender gap reversal
in university attendance observed empirically. The existence of a higher college wage
premium for women is, however, a highly debatable assumption, that received little
support from the empirical literature. Dougherty (2005) is one of the few contributions
showing a higher college wage premium for women in the US, and the methodology
underlying his estimations have been strongly criticized in Hubbard (2011)1. Becker et
al. (2010) also report that the estimated beneﬁts from college are still lower for women
in most dimensions, although some of them increased faster from women over the past
decade in the US. In the absence of a higher college premium for women, changes in
social norms are unable to explain the gender gap reversal in university attendance.
Also, all the above-mentioned explanations were only applied to the US.
To explain the quasi-universal reversal in the educational gender gap, we build on
a quasi-universal fact: the greater dispersion in men's test score distribution relative
to women's test score distribution. In addition, we show that our model is able to
reproduce the reversal in the gender gap in participation to tertiary education, as well as
1After correcting for a bias in estimates of college wage premium, Hubbard (2011) ﬁnds that there
has been essentially no gender diﬀerence in the college wage premium
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the dynamics of the gender ratio among secondary school non-completers. The chapter
is organized as follows: Section 2 reports the evidence about the greater dispersion of
males' performance in cognitive and non-cognitive tests relative to females. Section 3
describes our modiﬁed Becker model of optimal investment in human capital. Building
on our distributional assumption, Section 4 presents the predictions of the model for the
joint evolution of aggregate educational enrollment, and the gender gap in educational
outcomes. It also evaluates the predictions of the model against cross-sectional on
dropout rates and university enrollment rates by gender.
2.2 The Greater Variability of Males' Test Score Distribu-
tion: Empirical Evidence
An important body of literature shows that males are more variable than females in
a wide range of cognitive and non-cognitive tests. While this stylized fact was very
recently established in the economics literature, long-standing evidence is available in
the psychology literature. Ellis (1894) is typically referred to as the contribution that
sparked the literature on gender diﬀerences in variability. Reviewing data from psy-
chological, medical and anthropometric studies, he comes to the conclusion than males
tend to exhibit more variability in both physical and psychological traits, including
general intelligence. Frasier (1919) is the ﬁrst study to compile a large dataset of more
than 60,000 observations to provide support to Ellis' original claim. Using grade-level
achievement tests for 13 year-olds in the US, he shows that the coeﬃcient of variation
- the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean - is larger for males, and that the
gender diﬀerence is highly statistically signiﬁcant.
More recently, Feingold (1992) reports the male-to-female variance ratio of the PSAT
and SAT of the College Entrance Examination Board in 1960, 1966, 1974 and 1983
consisting of a verbal and quantitative test. In both mathematics and verbal tests,
the male-to-female variance ratio was found to be larger than 1 (1.05 in Verbal and
1.20 in Mathematics for the SAT averaged over the 4 waves; 1.05 in Verbal and 1.24
in Mathematics for the PSAT averaged over the three waves), with little variation over
the diﬀerent waves. The results of Feingold (1992) have however been criticized on
the ground that they are drawn from a sample of individuals taking SAT, and not
representative of the entire population.
Hedges and Nowell (1995) address this issue by extending the analysis of Feingold
(1992) to 6 nationally representative surveys conducted in the US between 1960 and
1992. They compute the male-to-female variance ratio of 43 ability tests extracted from
the 6 surveys, and report that the variance of males is larger in 41 out of the 43 cognitive
13
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tests. The estimated variance ratio typically ranges between 1.05 and 1.30. Their
results also suggest that gender representation among the top-end and bottom-end of
the distributions diﬀers depending the type of ability tested. While males substantially
outnumber females among the top 10 % scoring individuals in mathematics, science,
and social studies, females tend to be in the majority in the upper tail of reading
comprehension perceptual speed and associative memory. In disciplines in which males
dominate the upper tail, however, the extent of overrepresentation is typically much
larger than the overrepresentation of females in disciplines where females dominate
the upper tail. More recently, Johnson et al. (2008) also addressed the potential
bias associated with non-representativeness of previous studies by using population-
wide data on general intelligence. Using two population-wide surveys of 11-year-olds
in Scotland, they also ﬁnd greater variability among males than females in the low end
and high ends of the distribution of general intelligence. They further report the greater
variability for males is larger in the lower end of the distribution, than in the upper end.
Evidence also suggest that the gender ratio in the extreme scores appear to be fairly
constant over-time. Hedges and Nowell (1995) ﬁnd little evidence that sex diﬀerences
in the variance of test scores have changed over time, although they compare surveys
targeting populations with diﬀerent ages. Nowell and Hedges (1998) use data from
seven representative surveys of the United States twelve grade population, and from
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NEAP) long-term trend data. They
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in the male-to-female ratio among extreme scores from 1960
to the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, they ﬁnd no evidence for a decrease in the
proportion of males among top performers over time.
Jacob (2002) provides further insight on the larger variability of males' ability distri-
bution. Whereas most studies focus on the distribution of cognitive skills, his analysis
investigates gender diﬀerences in the distribution of both cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. He uses data from a nationally representative cohort of eight graders in 1988
from the National Educational Longitudinal Study. Interestingly, while he reports that
while men's and women's IQ distributions are very similar in the sample, estimated
distributions of non-cognitive skills show a signiﬁcantly higher variance for males. He
uses 4 diﬀerent measures of non-cognitive skills, including a composite measure of dis-
ciplinary incidents computed from the NELS. The behavior composite score computed
from the data shows a standard deviation of 1.8 for males against only 1.2 for females.
More recently, Kenney-Bensen et al. (2006) also ﬁnd that the standard deviation of an
index of disciplinary skills is larger for boys. They use two measures of disruptive be-
havior in 5th and 7th grade. In 5th grade, the standard deviation of boys is 0.99 against
0.56 for girls, and 1.20 against 0.68 in 7th grade. If test scores are conceived as the
14
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observable outcome of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills, such evidence suggests
that the higher dispersion of non-cognitive skills among males could be an important
driving force behind the larger variability of males' performance in tests.
Potential gender diﬀerences in the distribution of abilities started to attract the at-
tention of economists only recently. While evidence from the psychological literature
was mostly conﬁned to the US, Pekkarinen and Machin (2008) show that the greater
variability in test scores among males is an internationally robust phenomenon. They
use test score data for 15 year olds from the Program for International Student As-
sessment (PISA) in 2003. The PISA study tests mathematical and reading skills for a
representative sample of the 15-year-old population of students, in more than 40 coun-
tries. Pekkarinen and Machin (2008) report that males' reading test score variance is
strictly larger than females test score variance in 39 countries out of 40. Mathematics
test score distribution exhibits a fairly similar pattern, with the male-to-female variance
ratio being strictly greater than 1 in 38 countries out of 40. The gender gap in variance
is statistically highly signiﬁcant: in all but 5 ﬁve countries, the null hypothesis that the
test score variance is equal across genders is rejected at the 5% level. The estimated
variance ratio is rather large in magnitude, with an average of 1.21 for reading and
1.20 for Mathematics. Although the male-to-female variance ratio is larger than 1 in
virtually all countries, it varies across countries: it ranges from a minimum of 1.00 in
Indonesia to 1.45 in Honk-Hong for reading test scores, and from 0.95 in Indonesia to
1.36 in Honk-Hong for Mathematics test scores. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the
main ﬁndings of Pekkarinen and Machin (2008), using data from PISA 2000.
Figure 2.1: PISA Male-to-Female Variance Ratios  Reading Scores
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Figure 2.2: PISA Male-to-Female Variance Ratios  Math Scores
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The greater dispersion of males' ability relative to females is already in place at
very early ages. In Table 2.1, we report the variance ratio of ability test scores at 9
months, 3 years, 5 years and 7 years of age from the UK Millennium Cohort Study.
At birth, we use birth weight as a proxy for ability, as it has been shown that birth
weight is an important predictor of future cognitive performance, school achievement,
and labour market outcomes. As shown in the ﬁrst row of the table, boys already
exhibit a higher variance in birth weights relative to girls, and the gender diﬀerence in
variance is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 % level. At 9 months, the variance of boys
in various measures of early development is larger for 9 out of 10 indicators, and the
gender diﬀerence in variance is again highly statistically signiﬁcant. A similar pattern is
observed for test scores at ages 5 and 7, at which all male-to-female variance ratios are
signiﬁcantly larger than one at the 1 % level. This suggests that the larger variability
of males observed at age 15 originates from very early ages, rather than being the result
of an endogenous response to gender diﬀerences in educational returns at later ages.
Some contributions propose an explanation for the larger dispersion of males' ability
distribution. Johnson et al (2009) with a commentary by Craig et al,(2009) discuss the
possible role of the X chromosome in explaining the diﬀerences between males and
females in variability of cognitive ability. They note that a large number of genes in the
X chromosome are related to general intelligence. Also, the fact that females have two X
chromosomes whereas males have one X chromosome and one Y chromosome seems to
play an important role in producing a higher variability for males. Since "Y chromosome
is very small and carries little beyond the genetic instructions for maleness", the X
16
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Table 2.1: Male-to-Female Variance Ratio in Ability Tests at Various Ages
S.d. Boys S.d. Girls Variance Ratio
Birth
Birth weight 0.606 0.565 1.15***
9 months
Sits up 0.147 0.131 1.26***
Hands together 0.254 0.214 1.41***
Holds small objects 0.214 0.176 1.48***
Passes a toy 0.121 0.106 1.14***
Walks a few steps 0.344 0.331 1.07***
Gives toy 0.361 0.313 1.33***
Waves bye-bye 0.486 0.427 1.30***
Extends arms 0.212 0.194 1.19***
Nods for yes 0.377 0.405 0.86***
Age 3
Colors Score 4.13 3.87 1.14***
Letters Score 2.61 2.68 0.95**
Numbers Score 3.79 3.56 1.13***
Size Score 2.82 2.78 1.03*
Comparisons Score 3.82 3.57 1.14***
Shapes Score 4.05 4.03 1.01
Vocabulary Score 4.81 4.75 1.03
Age 5
Pictures Score 3.58 3.47 1.06***
Construction Score 3.53 3.34 1.12***
Vocabulary Score 3.53 3.36 1.10***
Age 7
Reading Score 20.39 18.13 1.26***
Math Score 2.96 2.72 1.18***
Construction Score 7.29 6.91 1.11***
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Signiﬁcance levels indicate that the null hypothesis of equality of the variance for males and females
in the population is rejected at the given signiﬁcance-level.
Source. UK Millenium Cohort Study (MCS)
chromosome functions mostly alone, as Johnson et al note. This would allow recessive
genes to be expressed more frequently among males than among females, which would
increase the variance of males' characteristics. They also describe a mechanism based
on evolution theory that could explain why this is the case. The empirical estimates of
the male-female variance ratio in general intelligence they report in their paper range
between 1.06 and 1.19.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Static Framework of Investment in Education
The economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of agents that diﬀer in their
test-taking ability zj . Test-taking ability zj is continuous and perfectly observed by
individuals. It can be interpreted as a combination of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
relevant for educational achievement. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a single-
period model in which individuals perceive the beneﬁts of their investment in schooling
in the same period as they invest.
Individuals choose their years of schooling s so that they maximize their expected
discounted utility U . Building on Becker (1967), we deﬁne the utility function of indi-
viduals in the economy as:
U = B(s)− C(s) (2.1)
where B(s) denotes the beneﬁt function of schooling, with B′(s) > 0 and B′′(s) < 0.
C(s) is the cost function of schooling and is increasing and convex in s such that
C ′(s) > 0 and C ′′(s) > 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the individual maximization
problem can be expressed as:
B′(s) = C ′(s) (2.2)
Where B′(s) is interpreted as the marginal beneﬁt to schooling, and C ′(s) is the
marginal cost of schooling. Following Card (1994), we linearize the model by assum-
ing that B′(s) and C ′(s) are linear functions with individual-speciﬁc intercepts and
homogeneous slopes:
B′(s) = zj − k1s (2.3)
C ′(s) = k2s (2.4)
where k1 > 0 and k2 > 0. Intuitively, individuals with higher test-taking ability zj per-
ceive greater marginal beneﬁts (or equivalently, lower costs) from attending school. In
this framework, the optimal level of schooling s chosen by individual j can be expressed
as:
s∗j = zj · b (2.5)
where b ≡ 1k1+k2 , and can be interpreted as the marginal net beneﬁt of education.
The optimal value of sj is therefore strictly increasing in test-taking ability zj . In this
framework, let Hj denote the indicator variable taking the value 1 if individual j decides
18
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to attend higher education, 0 otherwise. H is deﬁned as a function of s∗ such that:
H(s∗) =
 1 if s∗ ≥ s¯0 if s∗ < s¯
where s¯ denotes the minimum number of years of schooling to obtain a university degree.
Therefore,
Hj = 1 if zj >
s¯
b
≡ z¯ (2.6)
where z¯ is the lower bound of test-taking ability such that the individual chooses to
enroll at university.
Figure 2.3 provides some supporting evidence for the relationship between test-
taking ability z and university attendance H. It clearly shows that propensity to attend
university is an increasing function of test scores obtained at age 15.
Figure 2.3: The Empirical relationship between test score z and enrollment at university
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2.3.2 Time Dynamics
We now assume that the economy is populated by successive cohorts t, with t ∈
{1, 2, .., T}. Each cohort comprises a continuum of agents that diﬀer in their level
of test-taking ability z. We denote fz(z) the probability density function of test-taking
ability z.
Individuals belonging to the same cohort t are exposed to the same value of the
exogenous parameter bt ≡ 1k1,t+k2,t , regardless of their test-taking ability or gender. In
this context, the enrollment rate in higher education at time t for each gender g can be
expressed as:
Eg,t = 1− Fz( s¯
bt
)
or, equivalently
Eg,t = Gz(
s¯
bt
) = Gz(z¯t) (2.7)
where Gz(z¯t) denotes the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of
test-taking ability z, deﬁned as:
∫ +∞
z¯ fz(z) dz.
bt is allowed to vary across cohorts and this is interpreted as a change in the net
beneﬁts of education, exogenous to the model. In this framework, an increase in the net
beneﬁts of education bt translates mechanically into higher enrollment rates at university
Et, and individuals with lower test-taking ability z choosing to enroll at university. bt
includes monetary beneﬁts of education as well as non-monetary beneﬁts such as life
expectancy, the propensity to marry and stay married, or household production.
There exists a important body of literature showing that returns to education, and
in particular returns to university education, have increased over the last decades. First,
monetary returns to tertiary education  the college wage premium  have been shown
to increase sharply over the last decades. Goldin and Katz (2009) or Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) among others provide consistent evidence showing a sharp increase of the
college wage premium in the US since the beginning of the 1970s1. Card and Lemieux
(2000) also report an important increase in the wage premium of university graduates
relative to high school graduates in the UK and Canada over the same period. Acemoglu
(2000) and Goldin and Katz (2009) invoke skill-biased technological change as the main
driving force behind the increase in the university wage premium, through an increased
demand for skilled workers. In particular, Goldin and Katz report a strong positive rela-
tionship between the utilization of more capital-intensive technologies and the demand
for university-educated workers. Acemoglu argues that the extent of skill-biased tech-
nological was such that it allowed to absorb an increasing supply of university-educated
1The college wage premium is deﬁned as the wage of college-educated workers relative to the wage
of high-school educated workers.
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workers, without a decrease in the college wage premium over the past decades. Ace-
moglu (1998) suggests that the increase in the supply of university-educated workers
may itself have induced further skilled-biased technological change, and therefore fur-
ther increased the college wage premium in the long run although it reduced it in the
short run.
The dramatic increase in life expectancy over the last century is another driving
force behind increased returns to education. Life-expectancy increased dramatically
for both men and women over the last half-century1. This increases the returns to
education b through two main channels: ﬁrst, by increasing the expected time-frame
over which the monetary returns to education investments are received. Second, Meara
et al. (2008) show that at least in the US life expectancy increased disproportionately
for university graduates relative to high school-graduates, thereby reinforcing incentives
to invest in tertiary education.
Our model implies that an increase in the enrollment rate into tertiary education Et
goes together with a decrease in the test-taking ability threshold z¯ for choosing to attend
university. Although the lower bound of test-taking ability for university attendance z¯
can hardly be observed in the data, we can observe the average test-taking ability of
individuals attending university, which mechanically decreases with z¯. To check whether
increased enrollment at university over time was actually accompanied by a decrease in
z¯, we computed the average IQ score of individuals attending university in the US over
the period 19742010, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS). Each wave
surveys a random sample of 1,000 to 5,000 individuals. From 1974 onwards, the GSS
includes a simpliﬁed IQ test consisting of 10 questions assessing the cognitive skills of
the respondents. A measure of educational attainment (in years) is also reported, and
we classify individuals with more than 12 years of education as having attended college.
Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the average IQ of university students relative to the
all population in number of standard deviations, over the period 1975-2010. It shows
a clear downward trend: while in 1974 the average IQ of students attending tertiary
education was close to 0.60 standard deviation higher than the average IQ of the all
population, this relative diﬀerence decreased by half until 2005 to reach approximately
0.30. The data therefore seems to support our claim that greater access to university
education was accompanied by a decrease in the average test-taking ability of students
attending higher education.
1Between 1960 and 2010, the mean life expectancy of males increased globally by 15.2 years from
52 to 67.2. For females the increase was 16 years from 55.7 to 71.7. The numbers are calculated as an
unweighted mean of all countries for which there is data available for years 1960 and 2010 in the data
provided by World Bank.
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Figure 2.4: The Empirical Relationship between the Enrollment Rate E and the Average
Test Score of the Enrolled - All Population
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Notes. Dashed lines represent conﬁdence intervals at the 5%-level.
2.3.3 Implied Relationship between Total Enrollment Rate and Female-
to-Male Ratio
Building on evidence about gender diﬀerences in test score variability, we now allow
fz(z) to diﬀer between genders. Let fzm(z) and fzf (z) denote the probability density
functions of test-taking ability for males and females respectively, with V ar[zm] >
V ar[zf ]. In words, males and females in a given cohort are assumed to draw their
test-taking ability from two diﬀerent distributions1. Each cohort is assumed to be split
equally between males and females, and the distribution of test-taking ability for each
1We assume the the distribution function types to be the same, allowing the parameters to vary.
For all empirical applications, we also assume normality of the two distributions.
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gender g ∈ {m, f} is assumed to be invariant over time:
fzg ,t(z) = fzg(z) (2.8)
Panel A of Figure 2.5 illustrates the two test-taking ability distributions, when
σ2m>σ
2
f and µ
2
m<µ
2
f . It also depicts the two CCDFs of zm and zf , denoted Gzm(z¯) and
Gzf (z¯), respectively and deﬁned as:
Gz(z¯) =
∫ +∞
z¯
fz(z) dz
. In the illustrational graph, test-taking ability z is assumed to be normally distributed
in the population for both genders, with zm ∼ N(µm, σ2m) and zf ∼ N(µf , σ2f ). By
combining the two complementary cumulative distributions Gzm(z¯) and Gzf (z¯), it is
possible to compute the total enrollment rate in tertiary education in the economy as:
x = E(z¯) ≡ Gzf (z¯) +Gzm(z¯)
2
(2.9)
which is represented by the thin dotted line in panel B of Figure 2.5, and obtained
by averaging the two complementary cumulative distributions, assuming that males and
females are equally split in the population. In this framework, the female-to-male ratio
among the enrolled, denoted R(z¯), can be expressed as:
y = R(z¯) ≡ Gzf (z¯)
Gzm(z¯)
(2.10)
From Panel B of Figure 2.5, we can derive the relationship between total enrollment
rate and the female-to-male ratio among the enrolled. Figure 2.6 illustrates the expected
relationship between the total enrollment rate and the female-to-male ratio among the
enrolled, when σ2m>σ
2
f , as depicted in Panel A and B of Figure 2.5.
R(z¯) and E(z¯) are both functions of the lower bound of test-taking ability for en-
rolling z¯, which varies with the exogenous parameter b. Under the assumption that
V ar[zm] > V ar[zf ], it can be shown analytically that the relationship between R(z¯)
and E(z¯) has 3 notable properties:
Proposition 1 The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to zero when the total enroll-
ment rate E(z¯) tends to zero.
Proposition 2 The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to one when the total enroll-
ment rate E(z¯) tends to one.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution Functions of Test Scores by Gender when σ2m > σ
2
f - Illustration
x1
PANEL A
fm(z)
ff(z)
PANEL B
talent, z
Gm(z)
Gf(z) =1
Gm(z)
Gf(z)
(Gm(z) + Gf(z))/2
Notes. Panel A shows the probability distribution functions of test-taking ability z among males (full
line) and females (dashed line), when test-taking ability z is normally distributed and σm>σf . Panel
B shows the complementary cumulative distributions, resulting from the integration from +∞ to z of
fzf (z) and fzm(z).
Proposition 3 There exists a value of E(z¯) ∈ [0, 1[ such that R(z¯) = 1. This value
is unique and always exists.
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Figure 2.6: Expected Relationship between Total Enrollment Rate and Female-to-Male
Ratio of the Enrolled  Illustration
0 0.5 1
0.
5
1
Gm(z) + Gf(z)
2
Gf(z)
Gm(z)
Proof. See the Appendix. Importantly, the normality assumption is not required
for Proposition 1 to 3 to hold. As shown in the Appendix, Proposition 1 to 3 also hold
when z follows alternative two-parameter probability distribution functions.
An analogous reasoning can be applied to extract the relationship between sec-
ondary school non-completion rates and gender ratio among non-completers. The only
diﬀerence is that we work with the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) instead of
the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) since we are now dealing
with the lower tail of the probability density functions. In our setting, the secondary
school non-completion rate for each gender in a given cohort t is simply:
Nt = Fz(
s¯
bt
) = Fz(zt)
where
Fz(z) =
∫ z
−∞
fz(z) dz
and z denotes the lower bound of test-taking ability such that individuals complete
secondary school. The total non-completion rate for both genders in a given cohort is:
N(z) ≡ Fzf (z) + Fzm(z)
2
(2.11)
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Figure 2.7: Expected Relationship between Total Non-Completion Rate and Female-to-
Male Ratio among Non-Completers  Illustration
0 0.5 1
0.
5
1
Fm(z) + Ff(z)
2
Ff(z)
Fm(z)
Note. The parameters are the same as in Figure 2.6. Since the process goes from the lower tail up, the
curve takes a diﬀerent form.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a theory which allow us to study the coevolution of
university enrollment rates and gender ratios, as well as high school non-completion rates
and gender ratios. We have also shown three properties that the evolution should exhibit
in the case that male variance in test-taking ability is higher than female variance.
2.5 Technical Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1 to 3 - Normal Distributions
Let fzf (z) and fzm(z) denote the probability distribution functions of talent z for
females and males, respectively. We assume for the sake of the argument that:
zf ∼ N(µf , σ2f )
and
zm ∼ N(µm, σ2m).
where σ2m > σ
2
f .
Proof of Proposition 1. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to zero when the
26
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
2.5 Technical Appendix
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to zero.
First, it is immediate to see that limz¯→∞E(z¯) =
Gzf (z¯)+Gzm (z¯)
2 =
0+0
2 = 0. where
Gz(z¯) denotes the complementary cumulative distribution function (or tail distribution
function) of talent z, deﬁned as
∫ +∞
z¯ fz(z) dz.
Let us now study limz¯→∞R(z¯). Using the analytical expression of the probability
distribution function of the normal distribution, the ratio R(z¯) can be expressed as:
R(z¯) =
∫∞
z¯
1√
2piσ2f
e
(z¯−µf )2
2σ2
f dz
∫∞
z¯
1√
2piσ2m
e
(z¯−µm)2
2σ2m dz
Taking the integral, one can express the ratio as:
R(z¯) =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µf√
2σ2f
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µm√
2σ2m
]) ,
where erf(·) denotes the Gauss error function, expressed as erf(z) = 2√
pi
∫ z
0 e
−t2 dt.
Using the analytical expression of R(z¯), we get:
lim
z¯→∞
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µf√
2σ2f
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µm√
2σ2m
]) = lim
z→∞
1− (erf [z¯])
1− (erf [z¯]) =
1− 1
1− 1 =
0
0
,
where the second to last step follows from the fact that limz¯→∞ erf(z¯) = 1.
Thus, we need to use the l'HÃpital rule. We take the derivative for the denominator
and the numerator to get the following expression:
lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
(z¯ − µm)2
σ2m
− (z¯ − µf )
2
σ2f
}
= lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
(z¯ − µm)2σ2f
σ2mσ
2
f
− (z¯ − µf )
2σ2m
σ2fσ
2
m
}
=
= lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
z¯2σ2f − 2z¯µmσ2f + µ2mσ2f − z¯2σ2m + 2z¯µfσ2m − µ2fσ2m
σ2mσ
2
f
}
=
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= lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
z¯
σ2mσ
2
f
[
z¯{σ2f − σ2m} − 2µmσ2f + 2µfσ2m +
µ2mσ
2
f
z¯
− µ
2
fσ
2
m
z¯
]}
=
= 0,
since by assumption σ2m > σ
2
f , and both are positive by deﬁnition.
Proof of Proposition 2. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to one when the
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to one.
First, it is immediate to see that limz¯→infty E(z¯)
Gzf (z¯)+Gzm (z¯)
2 =
1+1
2 = 1.
Let us now study the behavior of R(z¯) when z¯ tends to −∞.
lim
z¯→−∞
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µf√
2σ2f
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µm√
2σ2m
]) = lim
z¯→−∞
1− (erf [z¯])
1− (erf [z¯]) =
1 + 1
1 + 1
= 1.
where we use the fact that limz¯→−∞ erf(z¯) = −1.
Proof of Proposition 3. There exists a value of E(z¯) such that R(z¯) = 1. This
value is unique and always exists.
Let us now show that given our distributional assumptions, there exists a value of z
denoted z∗, such that the numerator and denominator are of equal value, thus the ratio
is one. Again, we invoke the ratio
R(z¯) =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µf√
2σ2f
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯−µm√
2σ2m
]) .
Since we know that the error function is monotonously increasing on the whole domain,
R(z¯) = 1 when
z¯−µf√
2σ2f
z¯−µm√
2σ2m
= 1⇔ z¯ − µf
σ2f
=
z¯ − µm
σ2m
⇔ z¯ = µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm .
This equation has a unique solution given σm > σf . Since the support of E(z¯) is
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the whole real line, there always exists a value of z¯ denoted z¯∗ such that
z¯∗ =
µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm .
In addition, z¯∗ is unique given the vector of exogenous parameters {µf , µm, σf , σm}.
2.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1 to 3 - Log-normal Distributions
Proof of Proposition 1. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to zero when the total
enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to zero.
First, it is immediate to see that limz¯→∞C(z¯) =
Gzf (z¯)+Gzm (z¯)
2 =
0+0
2 = 0.
The ratio R(z¯) of two log-normal complementary CDFs can be expressed as:
R(z¯) =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µf√
2σf
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µm√
2σm
])
Now,
lim
z¯→∞
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µf√
2σf
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µm√
2σm
]) = 1− erf [∞]
1− erf [∞] =
1− 1
1− 1 =
0
0
,
since limz¯→∞ erf(z¯) = 1.
We then use the l'HÃpital rule:
lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
(log z¯ − µm)2
σ2m
− (log z¯ − µf )
2
σ2f
}
= lim
log z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
(log z¯ − µm)2σ2f
σ2mσ
2
f
− (log z¯ − µf )
2σ2m
σ2fσ
2
m
}
=
= lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
(log z¯)2σ2f − 2 log z¯ µmσ2f + µ2mσ2f − (log z¯)2σ2m + 2z¯µfσ2m − µ2fσ2m
σ2mσ
2
f
}
=
= lim
z¯→∞
σm
σf
exp
{
log z¯
σ2mσ
2
f
[
log z¯(σ2f − σ2m)− 2µmσ2f + 2µfσ2m +
µ2mσ
2
f
log z¯
− µ
2
fσ
2
m
log z¯
]}
=
= 0,
since by assumption σ2m > σ
2
f , and both are positive by deﬁnition.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to one when the
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to one.
First, it is immediate that limz¯→0E(z¯)
Gzf (z¯)+Gzm (z¯)
2 =
1+1
2 = 1. Since the support
of the log-normal distribution is (0,+∞).
Let us now study limz¯→0R(z¯):
lim
z¯→0
R(z¯) = lim
z¯→0
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µf√
2σf
])
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µm√
2σm
]) = 1− erf [−∞]
1− erf [−∞] =
1 + 1
1 + 1
= 1.
and
lim
z¯→0
(Rz¯) =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µf√
2σf
])
+ 12
(
1− erf
[
log z¯−µm√
2σm
])
2
=
=
2− erf [−∞]− erf [−∞]
4
= 1
Proof of Proposition 3. There exists a value of E(z¯) ∈ [0, 1) such that R(z¯) = 1.
This value is unique and always exists.
As with the normal distribution, we use the fact that the error function is monotonously
increasing. Thus, R(z¯) = 1 when:
log z¯−µf√
2σ2f
log z¯−µm√
2σ2m
= 1⇔ log z¯ − µf
σ2f
=
log z¯ − µm
σ2m
⇔ log z¯ = µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm .
if µf = µm = µ, R(z¯) = 1 when log z¯ = µ.
Since the support of E(z¯) is the positive the real line, there always exists a C(log z¯)
such that
log z¯ =
µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm ⇔ z¯
∗ = exp
{
µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm
}
.
In addition, z¯∗ is unique given the vector of exogenous parameters {µf , µm, σf , σm}.
2.5.3 Proof of Proposition 1 to 3 - Uniform Distributions
Proof of Proposition 1. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to zero when the total
enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to zero.
We study the behavior of the ratio R(z¯) when z¯ tends to bf , since before that point it
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is evident that no female attends college, and thus the ratio has to be 0. Thus,
limz¯→bf
(bm − am)(bf − z¯)
(bf − af )(bm − z¯) =
(bm − am)(bf − bf )
(bf − af )(bm − bf ) =
(bm − am)(0)
(bf − af )(bm − bf ) = 0.
From the deﬁnition of the CDF of a uniform distribution (from the top): Fz(z¯) =
0 for z¯ ≥ b
b−z¯
b−a for z¯ ∈ (a, b)
1 z¯ ≤ a.
.
Proof of Proposition 2. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to one when the
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to one.
To study the other extreme we set z¯ to tend to am < af . By deﬁnition, limz¯→amR(z¯) =
limz¯→am
CDFf (z¯)
CDFm(z¯)
= 11 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. There exists a value of E(z¯) ∈ [0, 1[ such that R(z¯) = 1.
This value is unique and always exists.
R(z¯) = 1 when bf−z¯bf−af =
bm−z¯
bm−am ⇔ z¯∗ =
af bm−ambf
(af−am)−(bf−bm) , which is unique and exists
when bf 6= bm or af 6= am and (af − am) 6= (bf − bm). One of the ﬁrst two inequalities
will hold as long as the two distributions are not identical, as we assume. The last
inequality holds since, by assumption, V ar[zm] > V ar[zf ].
2.5.4 Proof of Proposition 1 to 3 - Logistic Distributions
We assume for the sake of the argument that:
zf ∼ Logi(µf , sf )
and
zm ∼ Logi(µm, sm).
Proof of Proposition 1. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to zero when the
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to zero.
Using the analytical expression of the logistic probability density function, the ratio
R(z¯) can be expressed as:
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R(z¯) =
1− 1
1+exp
{
− z−µf
σf
}
1− 1
1+exp
{
− z−µm
σm
}
Thus,
lim
z¯→∞R(z¯) =
1− 11+exp{−∞}
1− 11+exp{−∞}
=
0
0
We thus need to us L'Hopital rule:
Proof of Proposition 2. The female-to-male ratio R(z¯) tends to one when the
total enrollment rate E(z¯) tends to one.
First, it is immediate that: limz¯→−∞C(z¯) = 1+12 = 1.
In addition,
lim
z¯→−∞R(z¯) =
1− 11+exp{∞}
1− 11+exp{∞}
=
1
1
= 1
Proof of Proposition 3. There exists a value of C(z¯) ∈ [0, 1[ such that R(z¯) = 1.
This value is unique and always exists.
Therefore,
R(z¯) = 1
is true if and only if
1− 1
1 + exp
−(z¯−µf )
sf
= 1− 1
1 + exp −(z¯−µm)sm
−(z¯ − µf )
sf
=
−(z¯ − µm)
sm
Reorganizing yields:
z¯∗ =
µmσf − µfσm
σf − σm .
which always exists since z¯ is deﬁned on the entire real line. In addition, this z¯∗ is
unique given the vector of exogenous parameters {µf , µm, σf , σm}.
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3Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in
Educational Outcomes: Fitting and
Testing the Theory
with Laurent Bossavie
3.1 Introduction
We show in this chapter that the theory proposed in Chapter 2 can explain the four
stylized facts proposed in Chapter 1. The ﬁrst two of those facts were the gender gap in
participation to university, and its reversal from male majority to female majority over
time. The other two were the gender gap in secondary school non-completion rates, and
its reversal from female majority to male majority. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst
attempt to account for all four facts with a single theory using international data.
The theory, which is based on the higher dispersion of male test-taking ability, is
able to capture the empirically observed dynamics of the gender ratio in both the uni-
versity enrollment rate and high school non-completion rate. Simulated predictions for
gender ratios using parameters from our model ﬁts and PISA assessment estimates are
signiﬁcantly correlated. This gives further support for our theory. In addition, it shows
that the model resonates country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in test-taking ability distributions
between genders.
Previous attempts in the literature have focused on the college gap reversal in the
US. The theory proposed in Chiappori at al. (2009) is able to account for the reversal,
although Hubbard (2011) criticizes the assumption that women have a higher college
wage premium in the US. Goldin et al. (2006) invoke the removal of past barriers
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to womens' education and careers, combined with a higher college wage premium for
women, as an explanation for this stylized fact over the period 19702010.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we describe the data used
in the analysis and arguments as to why the particular dataset was used. We explain
the method we use for the numerical estimation of the model in section 3. In section 4,
we describe the ﬁt with the data and show that it captures some characteristic of the
country level diﬀerences in gender distributions of test-taking ability.
3.2 Data
Our data on total enrollment rates and gender ratios are from two main sources. Data
on tertiary education enrollment rates is from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics,
which records information on enrollment rates by gender for almost 200 countries over
the period 19702010. The available measure for tertiary enrollment rates is the Gross
Enrollment Ratio (ger), deﬁned as the total number of students registered in tertiary
education regardless of their age, expressed as a percentage of total mid-year population
in the 5 year age group after the oﬃcial secondary school leaving age (typically between
18 and 23). Formally, it can be expressed as:
gert =
Et
P t
· 100
where Et is the total number of individuals enrolled in tertiary education at time t.
It includes all students oﬃcially enrolled in ISCED 5 and 6 levels of tertiary educa-
tion1. P t is the number of individuals belonging to the ﬁve-year age group following
on the secondary school leaving age in year t. gert is therefore not bounded to be
lower than 100%. It is a noisy measure of its theoretical counterpart in our model
xt ≡ Ci(z¯t) ≡ Gzf (z¯t)+Gzm (z¯t)2 , which is the fraction of individuals belonging to a syn-
thetic age-cohort enrolling into tertiary education. We are, however, mainly interested
in the comparative evolution of this ratio by gender, rather than in its absolute value.
In addition, the ger is the only measure of tertiary enrollment available by gender on a
yearly basis for a period of 40 years, in a large sample of countries.
Our data for upper-secondary school non-completion rates is from the Barro-Lee
database 2010. The dataset records aggregate information on upper-secondary school
1ISCED 5 refers to the ﬁrst stage of tertiary education, and includes both practically-
oriented/occupationally speciﬁc programs and theory-based programs, respectively referred as 5B and
5A in the International classiﬁcation of the United Nations. ISCED 6 refers to the second stage of
tertiary education leading to the award of an advanced research degree
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completion by gender, for more than 140 countries. Contrary to the UNESO data which
measures the stock of tertiary educated individuals in a given country in a given year,
the Barro-Lee dataset contains information on upper-secondary school completion rate
by cohort of birth. It is therefore a ﬂow measure of human capital, and is in this
respect more sensitive to cohort-by-cohort changes in educational choices. The Barro-
Lee dataset allows us to observe secondary school non-completion rates by gender for
5-year band birth cohorts born from 18911895 to 19811985 1. In total, we can extract
the total secondary school non-completion rate and the female-to-male ratio among non-
completers for 16 ﬁve-year-band cohorts in more than 150 countries. The drawback of
the Barro-Lee dataset is that the measurement of educational attainment may vary
for some countries. In particular, the data appears to be less reliable for developing
countries.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Our dataset allows to observe the following 2 × T matrix for each country i in our
sample: 
xi1 yi1
xi2 yi2
... ...
xiT yiT

where xit denotes the total enrollment rate in country i and year t, and yit denotes
the female-to-male ratio of country i in year t. In the context of our model, the total
enrollment rate xit is deﬁned as xit = Ei(z¯it) ≡ Gzf (z¯it)+Gzm (z¯it)2 where x = C(.) :
z¯ → [0, 1], given the two underlying distributions Gzf and Gzm . Contrary to z¯it, xit
presents the advantage of being observable in the data. Assuming normality, the two
distributions are fully characterized by the two-parameter vectors (µm, σ2m) and (µf ,
σ2f ), respectively.
The parameters of our model can easily be reduced to two, by normalizing one of
the two probability density functions. We choose to standardize the female probability
density function such that ff (z¯it) ∼ N(0, 1), and denote (µi, σ2i ) the ﬁrst two moments
1The aggregate Barro-Lee database was mostly constructed from nationally-representative surveys
in which the exact year of birth of the respondent is typically not available for anonymity reasons.
Instead, a ﬁve-year window of the individual's age is usually given.
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of males' test taking ability distribution relative to females in country i. Formally,
µi =
µi,m − µi,f
µi,f
= µi,m (3.1)
σi =
σi,m
σi,f
= σi,m (3.2)
In this setting, our model of investment in human capital predicts a unique value
yˆit of yit, conditional on the triplet {xit, µi, σi}. Given the 2 × T matrix, it is possible
to estimate the vector of parameters {µi;σi} for country i by maximum-likelihood esti-
mation, such that the distance between the actual data points and the ones predicted
by our model is minimized.
Let z¯it denote the test-taking ability cutoﬀ in year t in country i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
above which individuals attend tertiary education. Test-taking ability for males and
females are random variables, denoted zm and zf , respectively. Both are assumed to be
normally distributed and their mean and standard deviation are allowed to diﬀer across
countries. We are interested in estimating the following model:
yit =
Gzf (z¯it)
Gzm(z¯it)
· exp(it), (3.3)
where exp(it) ∼ lnN(µ, σ2 ) Taking the logs of equation (13) yields:
log yit = logGzf (z¯it)− logGzm(z¯it) + it, (3.4)
where i ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
In addition, the analytical expressions for Gzf (z¯it) and Gzm(z¯it) are given by:
Gzf (z¯it) =
∫ ∞
z¯it
1√
2piσ2f
e
(z−µf )2
2σ2
f dz =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯it − µf√
2σ2f
])
(3.5)
Gzm(z¯it) =
∫ ∞
z¯it
1√
2piσ2m
e
(z−µm)2
2σ2m dz =
1
2
(
1− erf
[
z¯it − µm√
2σ2m
])
(3.6)
where erf(·) denotes the Gauss error function, expressed as erf(z) = 2√
pi
∫ z
0 e
−t2 dt.
The x-axis in the model is however not the test-taking ability variable, but the average
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of the two CCDFs:
xit = Eit(z¯it) ≡
Gzf (z¯it) +Gzm(z¯it)
2
=
1
4
2− erf
 z¯it − µf√
2σ2f
− erf [ z¯it − µm√
2σ2m
]
(3.7)
We are interested in the inverse of this function. For practical purposes, we calculate
numerically the inverse value z¯it = C−1it (xit). The likelihood function can be expressed
as:
L(θi|z¯it) = L(θi|E−1i (xi)) = logGzm(E−1i (xit))− logGzm(E−1i (xit)) + it, (3.8)
where θi = {µi, σi}. Since the error term is normal, the model can be ﬁtted by mini-
mizing the sum of squared errors of the likelihood function, given diﬀerent values of the
parameters. Without any loss of generality, the number of parameters can be decreased
to two by normalizing one of the two test-taking ability distributions, namely the one
denoting females, to a standard normal i.e ∀i = {1, 2, ..., n} : zf ∼ N(0, 1). Thus, the
model is a non-linear mapping from xi to yi, whose form is deﬁned by the parameters of
the male distribution, when the female distribution in normalized to a standard normal
distribution.
The maximum-likelihood estimator of θi = {µi, σi, αi} can be expressed as:
L({θi|z}) = 1
(2piσ2 )
n
2
·exp
{
− 1
2σ2
·
n∑
i=1
(
log yit − logGzf (E−1i (xit)) + logGzm(E−1i (xit))
)2}
(3.9)
To obtain the values of θi = {µi, σi} that maximize this likelihood, we take the Least-
Squares ﬁt given by:
ˆθMLE = min
θi∈Θ
n∑
i=1
{
log yit − logGzf (E−1i (xit|θi)|θi) + logGzf (E−1i (xit|θi)|θi)
}2
(3.10)
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Model Fit
Figure 3.1 depicts the estimated relationship between the total enrollment rate in ter-
tiary education x and the female-to-male ratio y when {µi;σi} are estimated from the
2 × T matrix, as described in the previous section. As shown in the ﬁgure, our model
generates an accurate ﬁt for the relationship between x and y observed in each indi-
vidual country. In a similar way, Figure 3.2 shows our model ﬁt for the relationship
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between the secondary school non-completion rate, and the gender ratio among non-
completers. As depicted in the ﬁgure, our model also generates a very satisfactory ﬁt
for the gender ratio in the lower tail of educational distribution. Contrary to university
enrollment rates data, the advantage of the secondary school non completion data is
that it ranges from virtually 100% for cohorts born at the end of the 19th century until
less than 10% nowadays in some countries. It therefore allows us to reconstruct the al-
most entire path of the gender ration among non-completers, as a function of secondary
school non completion rates. In particular, it allows to conﬁrm that when the secondary
non-completion rate increases at high levels of non-completion, the gender-ratio gradu-
ally decreases and converges to 1 for a 100% non-completion rate, as predicted by our
model. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst contribution to account for the gender gap
reversal among secondary school non- completers, in addition to university students.
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3.4 Results
Figure 3.1: Model Fit - Gender Ratio in Participation to Tertiary Education
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Notes. The x-axis measures the total gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education for country i. The
y-axis measures the females-to-males ratio in tertiary education for country i. Each dot corresponds
to a yearly observation of {xi; yi} for country i from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The full
line depicts the estimated relationship between y and x from our model when {µi;σi} are estimated by
maximum likelihood to minimize the error sum of squares.
3.4.2 Matching our Estimates with PISA Distributions
Our model is: log yt = logR(C−1(xt, µ, σ), µ, σ) + t. Given our estimates for µ and
σ, the model predicts the gender ratio yˆ among the enrolled, for a given value of the
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Notes. The x-axis measures the total gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education for country i. The
y-axis measures the females-to-males ratio in tertiary education for country i. Each dot corresponds
to a yearly observation of {xi; yi} for country i from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The full
line depicts the estimated relationship between y and x from our model when {µi;σi} are estimated by
maximum likelihood to minimize the error sum of squares.
enrollment rate x. To assess its validity, we simulate the model with {µˆi σˆi} obtained
from our ﬁt with the UNESCO enrollment data, and a ﬁxed value of of x. We then
repeat the same procedure by inputing {µˆi σˆi} extracted from PISA test score distri-
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3.4 Results
Figure 3.2: Model Fit - Gender ratio among Secondary School Non-Completers
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Notes. The x-axis measures the rate of secondary school non-completion for country i. The y-axis
measures the females-to-males ratio among secondary school non-completers for country i. Each dot
corresponds to a yearly observation of {xi; yi} for country i from Barro-Lee (2010). The full line depicts
the estimated relationship between y and x from our model when {µi;σi} are estimated by maximum
likelihood to minimize the error sum of squares.
butions, and the same ﬁxed value of of x. We obtain two vectors of yi's and measure to
which extend they correlate for countries that both available in the UNESCO and PISA
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Notes. The x-axis measures the total gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education for country i. The
y-axis measures the females-to-males ratio in tertiary education for country i. Each dot corresponds
to a yearly observation of {xi; yi} for country i from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The full
line depicts the estimated relationship between y and x from our model when {µi;σi} are estimated
by maximum likelihood to minimize the error sum of squares. Column (1) depicts our result using
Estimator 1, column (2) shows our result using Estimator 2, as described in the previous section.
datasets. In total, 40 countries are common to both sources. In that sense, the PISA
parameters are used as a benchmark to which we compare the predictions of our model.
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3.5 Conclusion
The motivation behind this test is to check whether our model can capture underlying
diﬀerences in gender distributions on a national level that shows in PISA exams at 15
and our model ﬁt at around 18.
PISA assessments provide a suitable benchmark for underlying test-taking ability
distributions by gender. First, the PISA sample was designed to be representative of
the entire population of 15 year olds in a given country, since it surveys individuals
in schools before the end of compulsory education. Second, it has been designed to
be comparable across countries. Finally, it contains information on the gender of each
individual, therefore allowing to construct estimates of ability test score distribution by
gender in each country.
Table 3.2 shows the correlation between the yˆi's simulated from the two sets of
{µˆi, σˆi} obtained from our model ﬁt, and the PISA distributions. We use the PISA
dataset from year 2000 to get as close to the median year of the UNESCO data to
minimize any attenuation bias that might emerge if there is a systematic shift in the
relative distributions of females and males. We report correlations for 3 diﬀerent values
of x, x = 0.20, x − 0.50 and x0.70. Correlations between our predictions and PISA
estimates are large, and do not vary much depending on the value of x we consider. The
correlation of the gender ratio in a given quantile is approximately 0.4 with PISA reading
ability, and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The magnitude of the correlation is slightly lower
with PISA mathematics ability but remain larger than 0.3, and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
Table 3.1: Correlations between Predicted Gender Ratio by Quantile from our Estimates
and PISA Estimates
Predicted Gender Ratio - Model Fit
2nd decile 5th decile 7th decile 9th decile
Predicted Gender Ratio - PISA Math 0.242 0.309 0.366* 0.339*
(0.214) (0.109) (0.056) (0.078)
Predicted Gender Ratio - PISA Reading 0.060 0.245 0.427** 0.530***
(0.761) (0.208) (0.023) (0.004)
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Sample size is 28
countries. The sample is all available countries for which there is are at least 20 observations in time. p-values are reported in
parentheses.
3.5 Conclusion
Building on a simple framework of optimal investment in human capital, our model is
able to reconcile three internationally robust stylized facts: the greater dispersion of
men'a ability distribution relative to women, he progressive convergence and reversal in
the university attendance gender gap and a reversal in the high school non-completion
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Table 3.2: Correlations between Predicted Gender Ratio by Quantile from our Estimates
and PISA Estimates
Predicted Gender Ratio - Model Fit
2nd decile 5th decile 7th decile 9th decile
Predicted Gender Ratio - PISA Math 0.358* 0.394** 0.396** 0.370**
(0.052) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044)
Predicted Gender Ratio - PISA Reading 0.145 0.052 0.157 0.176
(0.446) (0.784) (0.406) (0.351)
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Sample size is 30
countries. The sample is all available OECD countries. p-values are reported in parentheses.
gender gap from female majority to male majority. Given data limitations and the in-
herent diﬃculty in measuring test-taking ability, our model provides a very satisfactory
ﬁt for the empirical relationship between total enrollment rate in tertiary education
and the female-to male ratio. It is also the ﬁrst theory to account for the convergence
and reversal of the gender gap in secondary school non-completion rates. Beyond the
particular question addressed in this paper, our ﬁndings suggest that gender diﬀerences
in ability distribution might be relevant to account for other gender-related stylized
facts in labour economics. Further research using this empirical fact to analyze other
aspects of the gender gap in economic outcomes would therefore be of particular inter-
est. Importantly, the larger variability of men's ability distribution observed empirically
remains mostly unexplained, and stands as another promising area for future research,
beyond the ﬁeld of Economics.
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4Explaining Gender Diﬀerences in
Educational Outcomes: Evaluating
Alternative Hypotheses
with Laurent Bossavie
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have shown that our theory ﬁts the empirical data quite accu-
rately. Some alternative explanations, however, are also consistent with the dynamics
observed in the data and can generate a similar reversal of the gender ratio. Theories
proposed in the literature have been focusing on explaining the gender gap reversal in
university attendance. Two main hypotheses have been formulated. First, as argued
in Chiappori et al. (2009), changes in social norms combined with higher returns to
education for females can produce a reversal from male majority to female among uni-
versity students. Second, a relative increase in females' mean test-taking ability over
time can also generate a reversal in the college gender gap, as suggested by Cho (2007).
In this chapter, we propose several tests to assess the validity of these two alternative
theories against empirical data. We ﬁrst formulate them in the framework we developed
in the previous chapters, and then assess their predictions against the ones of our
competing theory. All three hypotheses can be stated within the framework we have
established in the previous chapters:
Hypothesis 1, higher male variability hypothesis: The function Gz(·) is gender-
speciﬁc, but static over time, i.e. the higher dispersion in male test-taking ability
explains the college gender gap reversal. The lower bound of test-taking ability z¯ for
attending university is the same for both genders.
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Hypothesis 2, change in social norms hypothesis: The lower bound of test-taking
ability required for college varies between men and women, i.e. there exist gender-
speciﬁc z¯'s, z¯f and z¯m for females and males respectively, although the test-taking
ability distribution Gz(·) is the same for both genders. In the past, z¯f > z¯m and at
some point in time the situation reversed. This theory can also explain the college
gender gap reversal.
Hypothesis 3, increase in females' mean performance hypothesis: Over the last
decades, the female mean test-taking ability has increased relative to males. The vari-
ability of the distributions is the same and the z¯ is also the same for both genders.
Again, this hypothesis can explain the reversal.
These three hypotheses could theoretically be combined into joint hypotheses. How-
ever, we analyze them separately to retain maximum simplicity and assess their respec-
tive explanatory powers. In this chapter, we focus on Hypotheses 2 and 3 since we
have already closely scrutinized Hypothesis 1, our main hypothesis, in the preceding
chapters. We will only evoke it for comparison purposes.
To evaluate the change in social norms hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), we perform three
diﬀerent tests against our theory. All three tests reject the hypothesis that changes in
social norms are the main driving force behind the gender gap dynamics, and bring
further support to our theory.
Regarding the increase in females' mean performance over time (Hypothesis 3), we
argue that the results of previous studies might suﬀer from sample restriction biases.
Since evidence suggests that males' and females' variances of test-taking ability diﬀer,
sample restriction to one side of the distributions will bias estimates of gender diﬀerences
in mean ability. To address this issue, we use repeated cross sections of representative
samples of a given age population, for a wide range of countries. While females' mean
performance appears to have increased relative to males' in reading, we ﬁnd that fe-
males' tend to do relatively worse in mathematics compared to what they were used to.
Evidence in this respect is therefore ambiguous, and oﬀers little support for Hypothesis
3.
4.2 Change in Social Norms (Hypothesis 2)
4.2.1 The Change in Social Norm Hypothesis in our Framework
In our framework, the enrollment rate at university for each gender is:
E = 1− Fz( s¯
b
) = Gz(
s¯
b
) = Gz(z¯) (4.1)
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where Gz(.) denotes the CCDF of test-taking ability z. z¯ ≡ s¯b is the lower bound of
ability z such that individuals choose to attend university, where s¯ is the number of
schooling years required to obtain a university degree. b is an exogenous parameter,
which deﬁnes the net beneﬁts to education. We formulate the change in social norms
hypothesis by allowing b to diﬀer and change over time between the two genders, with
Gz(.) being identical for males and females. In this setting, it is possible to generate
the gender gap dynamics observed in the data if bf < bm originally, before gradually
converging and overtaking bm over time. Optimal levels of investment in schooling are
expressed separately for males and females as:
s∗i =
 zi · bm if malezi · bf if female
And the enrollment rate in higher education for each gender is:
E =
 Gz( s¯bm ) = Gz(z¯m) for malesGz( s¯bf ) = Gz(z¯f ) for females
where Gz(.) is identical for males and females.
In this context, bf > bm in most recent years is a necessary condition for the gender
gap reversal in university participation. This means that net beneﬁts for females have
to be higher than for males at the margin. Empirical evidence on larger returns to
education for females is ambiguous, however. An important component of monetary
returns to higher education is the college wage premium. Chiappori at al. (2009) Card
and DiNardo (2002), or Charles and Luoh (2003) for example ﬁnd a higher college
wage premium for women, but their estimations are restricted to the US. In addition,
the methodology behind the ﬁndings of these studies has been strongly criticized by
Hubbart (2011). In particular, he ﬁnds no gender diﬀerence in the US college wage
premium after correcting for a bias associated with income topcoding in the dataset
used by US studies. Cho (2007) further points out that the trends in the college wage
premium has been very similar for men and women over the last decades, making it
an unlikely explanation for the college gender gap reversal. Even if the college wage
premium is higher for females and some other other beneﬁts increased faster for females
over the last decades, Becker et al. (2010) argue that beneﬁts to higher education are
still lower for women in most dimensions. In the absence of bf>bm in recent years, the
change in social norms hypothesis alone would be unable to account for the reversal of
the gender ratio.
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Let us now ﬁt and assess Hypothesis 2, by allowing bf and bm to take any value.
Hypothesis 2 is very ﬂexible for ﬁtting the data. Since the relative changes of z¯f and
z¯m have not been constrained, we can even make an exact ﬁt with the data. The ﬁt is
depicted in Figure 4.1. The method for ﬁtting is straightforward. For each time period,
there is a system of two equations:
yt =
Gz(z¯f,t)
Gz(z¯m,t)
and
xt =
Gz(z¯f,t) +Gz(z¯m,t)
2
,
where xt and yt are known. By substituting we get:
yt =
Gz(z¯f,t)
2xt −Gz(z¯f,t)
We can easily solve numerically for the unknown and unique values of z¯f,t and z¯m,t.
To extrapolate outside the actual data range, we assume that z¯m and z¯f continue to
change at the average estimated pace of change between the years 1946 and 2009. The
estimated values of z¯f,t and z¯m,t and their change over time is depicted in Figure 4.2.
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2 Versus Hypothesis 1: Test 1
Hypothesis 2 appears to do an excellent job at explaining the reversal. However, it can
be shown that Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 have opposite implications regarding the
relationship between the total enrollment rate deﬁned as:
C(z¯f , z¯m) =
Gzf (z¯f ) +Gzm(z¯m)
2
(4.2)
and
E[zf |zf > z¯f ]− E[zm|zm > z¯m], (4.3)
which is the diﬀerence between the mean test-taking ability of females and males selected
into university education. This comes from the fact that Hypothesis 1 implies that zf
and zm have diﬀerent distributions and z¯f = z¯m, where as Hypothesis 2 would imply
that zf and zm are distributed according to the same distribution and that z¯f and z¯m
may diﬀer.
The change in social norms hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) implies that the average
test-taking ability is initially higher for enrolled females than for enrolled males, and
progressively converges towards it before taking lower values. On the other hand, Hy-
pothesis 1 implies that the females' average gets higher relative to males as the the
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Figure 4.1: The change in social norms hypothesis ﬁtted, with projections.
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Notes. The graph shows the exact ﬁt with the data obtained by varying z¯f and z¯m, as explained in
the text. The projections are made assuming an evolution of z¯f and z¯m that follows the average of the
ﬁtted years before and after the data range used.
fraction of population taking the test increases. When the test takers are a representa-
tive sample of the whole population, the observed mean diﬀerence becomes an estimate
of the mean diﬀerence of the whole population. To test these two opposite predictions
against the data, we analyze data on both the average performance in cognitive test by
gender, and the proportion of a given cohort taking the test.
Our data is from various sources. SAT mean test scores by gender are from the
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Figure 4.2: Change in social norms hypothesis ﬁtted values of z¯f and z¯m, with projections.
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Notes. The graph shows the values of ﬁtted z's from the exact ﬁt with the data obtained by varying z¯f
and z¯m as explained in the text. The projections are made assuming an evolution of z¯f and z¯m that
follows the average of the ﬁtted years before and after the data range used.
College Board which provides average mean scores for mathematics and reading by
gender from 1970 to 2010, as well as the total number of females and males taking the
test in a given cohort. We complemented this data with 4 US longitudinal surveys:
The National Longitudinal Study of the high school class of 1972 (NLS72), High School
and Beyond 1980 (HS&B), the National Educational Study of 1988 (NELS 88) and the
Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS 2002). From these data sets, we obtain
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the average test score of college students by gender over time, and can follow with total
enrollment rate through these 4 data points. We also use test score data from PISA for
both mathematics and reading, which are taken by a representative sample of the entire
population of 15 year olds in a given country. Finally, we also add Graduate Record
Examinations data from Graduate Record Examinations Board for the year 2000 for
quantitative, analytical and verbal skills. This is necessary to study results in tests that
are taken by only a small fraction of the population.
As depicted in Figure 4.3, while Hypothesis 1 generates an increase in the average
level of test-taking ability of females attending university relative to males over time,
the change in social norms hypothesis implies an evolution of the opposite sign, until
the sample restriction reaches a proportion of around 0.6 to 0.8 of the cohort taking the
test.
Figure 4.3 shows that Hypothesis 1 performs well at predicting the relationship
between the average gender in cognitive scores and the fraction of the population taking
the test, implied by z¯. It provides a good ﬁt for both the shape of the relationship
observed in the data, and the sign of the gender gap in average cognitive tests. The
data shows that males do better relative to females in a restricted sample selected from
the top of the distribution, than in the entire population. In PISA, which is a sample of
the entire population of 15 year-olds, females obtain higher average test scores relative
to males in reading. On the other hand, males perform on average better in the same
discipline with the SAT test. The higher male variability hypothesis (Hypothesis 1),
although not a perfect ﬁt, provides a simple explanation for the main facets of this
puzzle, relying on the fact that test-takers are drawn from diﬀerent ranges of the ability
distribution in these tests. This matters for the observed average performance by gender,
given diﬀerent underlying distributions of test-taking ability by gender assumed in our
model.
The alternative hypothesis of change in social norms (Hypothesis 2) neither predicts
the sign of the gender gap for the whole range, nor the sign of the relationship between
the gender gap in average test performance and the proportion of population taking the
test. According to this theory, the college gender gap reversal would be expected to
be accompanied by an analogous reversal in the test-taking ability of college students.
This does't appear to happen, although earlier SAT data would improve inference based
on test scores. The GRE exam scores especially follow the prediction of Hypothesis 1
rather than Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 4.3: Change in Social Norms Hypothesis Vs Model Fit for the Relationship between
Enrollment Rate and Gender Gap in Cognitive Score of the Enrolled
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
Enrollment rate / proportion of test takers
fe
m
a
le
−m
al
e 
di
ffe
re
n
ce
 in
 a
ve
ra
ge
 te
st
 s
co
re
 (in
 S
Ds
)
l
l
PISA reading
  PISA 
 math
LLS72 reading
LLS72 math
HSNB80 
reading
HSNB80 
math
BPS90 
reading
BPS90 
math
BPS04 reading
BPS04 mathl
GRE 2002 verbal
l
GRE 2002 quantitative
l
GRE 2002 analytical
SAT reading
SAT math
Hypothesis 1, mu=−0.17, sigma=1.82
Hypothesis 2, exact fit with ger
Hypothesis 2, linear projection
Notes. The x-axis represents the proportion of the cohort taking a given cognitive test. The y-axis
represents the female-to-male diﬀerence in means of the given cognitive test, expressed in standard
deviations units. The thick line depicts the expected relationship between the gender diﬀerence in
average cognitive score of university students as a function of total enrollment, as predicted by the
higher male variability hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). The thin solid line represents the evolution of the
same variable according to the ﬁt of the change in social norms hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), when males
and females cognitive score distributions are assumed to be the same, but women are initially facing a
higher z¯ relative to males that progressively converges to the males' level when university enrollment
increases. The thin dashed line represents the predicted evolution according to Hypothesis 2, assuming
a linear evolution of zm and zf that follows the average estimated evolution between 1946 and 2009.
The crosses and triangle dots represent the actual value of the gender diﬀerence in SAT test scores
for the entire population of SAT test-takers, as a function of the fraction of SAT test-takers in the
population. The ﬁlled squares represent similar values computed from US post-secondary longitudinal
surveys, for college students only. The ﬁlled dots represent GRE exam results for the year 2002.
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 2 Versus Hypothesis 1: Test 2
We also test the explanatory power of our theory against the change in social norms
hypothesis in a setting where we ﬁt our model against a proxy variable for female
emancipation at a country group level. We use data from the International Labour
Organization on female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) from 1980 to 2010 as
a proxy for women's emancipation. Table 4.2 shows the results of a numerical ﬁt of
the model when FLFPR is added as an explanatory variable as a proxy for females'
emancipation. Also, each country within the country group is controlled for with a
dummy variable to produce the following model:
log yi,t = log Gzf (E
−1(xi,t, µ, σ), µ, σ)−log Gzm(E−1(xi,t, µ, σ), µ, σ)+αi+β log FLFPRi,t.
The coeﬃcient associated with σ is signiﬁcant at the one percent level in all country
groups with bootstrapped standard errors. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient associated
with the proxy for women's emancipation is insigniﬁcant in all the regions, with the
exceptions of catholic Europe and Africa.
Table 4.1: Competing Hypothesis - Numerical Estimation 1980-2010
Africa Anglo- Catholic Protestant Eastern Latin Islamic Asia
Saxon Europe Europe Europe America
Dependent variable: females-to-males ratio in tertiary education
µˆ 0.17 -0.28 -0.07 -0.58 0.18** -0.58** 0.38 0.03
(0.33) (0.31) (0.35) (0.41) (0.09) (0.27) (0.24) (0.23)
σˆ 1.16* 1.56*** 1.34*** 1.74*** 1.18*** 1.39*** 1.23*** 1.21***
(0.1) (0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Women's -0.19 0.14 -0.14 0.11 -0.46*** -0.09 -0.17** 0.07
LFPR (0.28) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14)
Country F.E. X X X X X X X X
N. Countries 30 6 12 8 22 23 21 16
N. Observations 291 298 156 427 199 271 333 243
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the
10% level. Standards errors are bootstrapped.
4.2.4 Hypothesis 2 Versus Hypothesis 1: Test 3
Another way to discriminate between our theory and the change in social norms hy-
pothesis is to look at the evolution over time of the relationship between test score and
enrollment at university by gender. Hypothesis 1 assumes that test-taking ability is the
only relevant choice variable for choosing to attend university. This implies that the
empirical relationship between z and H should be identical for males and females, in
every given cohort. In particular, there should not be any gender-speciﬁc change in the
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Table 4.2: Competing Hypothesis - Numerical Estimation 1980-2010
Africa Anglo- Catholic Protestant Eastern Latin Islamic Asia
Saxon Europe Europe Europe America
Dependent variable: females-to-males ratio in tertiary education
µˆ -0.58 -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.18 -0.33 0.09 0.07
(0.39) (0.29) (0.15) (0.37) (0.21) (0.22) (0.12) (0.2)
σˆ 1.4*** 1.46*** 1.26*** 1.48*** 1.28*** 1.31*** 1.27*** 1.16***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Women's 0.83*** 0.44 0.73*** 0.16 0.26* 0.43* 0.16 -0.29
LFPR (0.31) (0.29) (0.22) (0.32) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18) (0.21)
Country F.E. X X X X X X X X
N. Countries 30 6 12 8 22 23 21 16
N. Observations 291 298 156 427 199 271 333 243
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the
10% level. Standards errors are bootstrapped.
relationship between z and H over time. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 implies that
females used to enroll less than males at university conditional on test scores (bf<bm),
while they now have a higher propensity to enroll for a given test-taking ability, since
bf>bm.
Figure 4.4: The Relationship between z and H by Gender: 1980 Vs 2002
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Source. High School and Beyond survey of 1980 (HS&B) and Educational Longitudinal Study (ELS)
of 2002
To assess these competing hypothesis, we use data from two longitudinal surveys
conducted in the US in 1980 and 2002. The ﬁrst of these surveys is the High School and
Beyond 1980, which follows a cohort of 10th graders in 1980 until university studies.
The second of these surveys is the US Educational Longitudinal Study 2002, which also
follows 10th graders in 2002 until university studies. These two datasets both survey a
representative sample of the same age group in the US population, and provide test score
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information in 10th grade on a comparable scale. In addition, they both allow us to
know whether individuals attended university education, and to match this information
with individual test scores in 10th grade. Using these two surveys, we constructed the
empirical relationship between z measured by test scores at age 15, and the propensity to
enroll at university H at two diﬀerent points in time: 1980 and 2002. We believe the 22-
year time span to be suﬃcient to detect asymetric changes by gender in the relationship
between z and H, especially in a period during which enrollment at university increased
dramatically in the US. The results of the analysis are depicted in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 shows two main patterns. First, females seem to be more likely to enroll
in college, conditional on test scores. Second, and most importantly in our context,
this was already the case in 1980. In other words, we do not observe any change in
the propensity of females to enroll at university conditional on test scores relative to
males, which goes against the change in social norms hypothesis. We further investigate
changes in the relationship between z and H quantitatively, using regression analysis.
The results are presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. As shown in Table 4.3, regression
analysis suggests that males enroll signiﬁcantly less at university than females for given
test scores. Interestingly, the point estimate of this negative eﬀect of being male is very
stable between 1980 and 2002: -0.083 in 1980, against -0.078 in 2002. In other words,
there is no evidence for women being penalized in university enrollment given their test
scores, as the change in social norm hypothesis would suggest. In addition, the eﬀect
of gender on university enrollment conditional on test scores is fairly stable over time,
which goes against the predictions of Hypothesis 2.
Table 4.4 brings further insights by running separate regressions by gender in 1980
and 2002. The intercept for both males and females increased sharply from 1980 to 2002,
reﬂecting the fact that both genders have a higher propensity to enroll at university in
2002 than in 1980, conditional on their test scores. Therefore, although the propensity
to enroll at university increased sharply over the period, there does not seem to be any
asymmetrical change in the relationship between test scores and university enrollment:
both genders enroll more at university conditional on their test scores, and males enroll
less at university than females given their test score both in 1980 and 2002. Interest-
ingly, the association between university enrollment and test scores have decreased for
both genders over the period. This may reﬂect the multiplication of US postgraduate
institutions in recent years implementing less strict criteria of admissions. Again, this
evolution appears to be quite symmetric between genders: the association decreased
from 0.25 to 0.19 for males, and from 0.21 to 0.16 for females. The interaction changes
from positive and signiﬁcant to negative and insigniﬁcant, but has only a distributional
eﬀect within boys, since the mean is very close to zero.
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Table 4.3: The Relationship between z and H: 1980 Vs 2009
Dep. variable: Propensity to Enroll at University
1980 2002
Male -0.086*** -0.083*** -0.076*** -0.078***
(0.01) (0.008) (0.007) (0.04)
Composite Test Score 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.18***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Interaction 0.027** -0.036
(0.01) (0.028)
Intercept
R-squared 0.142 0.151
N. observations 11,641 11,641 13,240 13,240
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Standards errors are bootstrapped.
Table 4.4: The Relationship between z and H in 1980 and 2009 - Separate Regressions
by Gender
Dep. Variable: Propensity to Enroll at University
1980 2002
Males Females Males Females
Composite Test Score 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.16***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Intercept 0.21*** 0.43*** 0.64*** 0.91***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
R-squared 0.163 0.120 0.146 0.145
N. observations 5,554 6,087 6,305 6,878
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
*: signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Standards errors are bootstrapped.
4.3 Increase in Females' Mean Performance (Hypothesis 3)
Our theory relies on the assumption that test score distributions for males and females
are ﬁxed over time, and in particular that the diﬀerence µf - µm is time-invariant.
Now, however, we study the possibility that the average performance of girls relative
to boys increased over time. In our setting, this corresponds to a shift of fzf to the
left relative to fzm , leading to an increase in Ef relative to Em, without any change in
z¯. This possibility has been investigated by Cho (2007) and Fortin (2011) for the US.
Fortin, however, ﬁnds no relative increase in girls' self-reported grades over the period
19702010. Using data from the Monitoring the Future study, she reports an increase
in high school grades for both boys and girls with parallel trends over the period, and
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girls already outperforming boys in the early 1970s. Cho, on the other hand, ﬁnds that
women's performance in high school, measured by test scores, increased more rapidly
than for men over the last three decades.
An important caveat of the analysis is that it applies to high school seniors, which
are approximately 18 at the time of the survey, and therefore beyond the compulsory
age of high school attendance. This means that if the hypothesis about higher male
variance is true, the mean of a restricted sample of students is a function of the ﬁrst
two moments of the underlying distribution, and the point of restriction.1. Since the
proportion of students taking the tests in Cho (2007) has changed over time, which
means that the point of restriction has changed, one would expect there to be changes
in the implied means even if the mean of the underlying distribution did not change.
To evaluate whether the mean performance of the female population increased over
time relative to boys, one should use a representative sample of the entire country
population of a given age group. This can be achieved by using school test scores
taken at an age at which schooling is still compulsory. In this respect, the Project
for International Student Assessment (PISA) surveys a representative sample of the
15-year-old population in more than 40 countries. In addition, test results have been
designed to be comparable over time. The drawback of this data, however, is that it
is only available from 2000 onwards, and therefore allows tracking relative changes in
mean performance between genders over the period 2000-2010. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6
depict the evolution of girls' mean average performance relative to boys in reading and
mathematics over the period 2000-2010 for around 40 countries included in PISA. They
show that while female relative average performance in reading seem to have increased
over the period 2000-2009, females appear to do worse in mathematics relative to males
in 2009 compared to 2000. Therefore, international evidence is mostly inconclusive
regarding the increase of female mean performance.
Given the short time-spam of the PISA study, we complement our analysis by looking
at the evolution of the performance of high school students by gender in the US, over the
period 19802002. To this purpose, we use two nationally representative longitudinal
surveys of high school students in the US conducted in 1980 and 2002. These surveys
both contain information on test scores in mathematics and reading when individuals
were in 10th grade. The results are depicted in Table 4.5. The table shows that the
average test score of female 10th graders has increased relative to boys in the US,
between 1980 and 2002. In mathematics, girls' disadvantage decreased from -0.121
to -0.107, whereas the girls advantage in reading score increased from 0.057 standard
1In the case of a random variable x that follows a normal distribution that is truncated from below,
E(x) = µ+ φ(α)
1−Φ(α)σ, where φ(·) is a standard normal PDF and Φ(·) is a standard normal CDF.
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Figure 4.5: Average PISA performance of males relatives to females in maths: 2000-2009
2000 2003 2006 2009
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
year
m
a
le
 m
in
u
s 
fe
m
a
le
 a
ve
ra
ge
 in
 P
IS
A 
m
at
h 
in
 S
Ds
unweighted mean
95% confidence interval
individual country
Figure 4.6: Average PISA performance of males relatives to females in reading: 2000-2009
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deviations from 0.148 standard deviation. Although these ﬁgures seem to suggest that
girls' average performance in high school increased relative to boys over the period,
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they should be interpreted with care. First of all, there is the usual sample restriction
issue since 10th graders in the US are already beyond the end of compulsory schooling.
Therefore, if high school dropout rates diﬀer between boys and girls and have changed
between 1980 and 2002, which is likely, changes in average performance of 10th graders
will give a biased estimate of the entire population. Second, one should keep in mind
that such evidence is restricted to the US. Data constraints do not allow to repeat a
similar exercise for other countries over the same period.
Table 4.5: Gender Diﬀerence in Average Test Score at Age 15: 1980 Vs 2002
1980 2002
Female Male F-M Diﬀ. Female Male F-M Diﬀ.
Mean Mean in S.d. Mean Mean in S.d.
Mathematics Score 49.41 50.62 -0.121*** 49.49 50.56 -0.107***
Reading Score 50.29 49.72 0.057*** 50.77 49.29 0.148***
Composite Score 49.52 50.50 -0.097*** 50.13 49.94 0.019
Notes. ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *: signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. Standards errors are bootstrapped.
Sources. High School and Beyond 1980 and US Educational Longitudinal Study
2002.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have formulated the two main competing hypotheses in the same
framework as the one developed for our theory. This allowed us to assess the predictions
of alternatives explanations against our theory in a common setting. We have shown
that alternative theories to the gender gap reversal in education appear to be inconsis-
tent with the data. On the other hand, our theory is not dismissed by the exact same
tests. Although we cannot exclude joint hypotheses as explanations behind the gender
gap reversal, it appears that a change in social norms or an increase in females' mean
performance alone cannot explain the patterns observed in the data.
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5Do Peers Matter in School
Performance and How? Evidence
from a Finnish High School
Quasi-Experiment
5.1 Introduction
The question of how students are aﬀected by their peers is an important one for educa-
tion policies, and the answer remains to be fully understood. We are both interested in
how school choice aﬀects a single student's results as well as the distributional eﬀects
of the whole student allocation on all the students' results. One of the fundamental
reasons for our relative lack of understanding in this ﬁeld is that educational systems
and the process of education are complex systems that rarely allow experimentation.
In addition, the fact that diﬀerent schooling systems in diﬀerent countries and regions
have distinct properties makes comparisons diﬃcult.
One of the properties of the Finnish high school system is a nation-wide application
system that matches the preferences of the applicants and preset student quotas for
the schools in a centralized manner. This system oﬀers a quasi-experimental regression
discontinuity (hereafter RD) design, which I exploit in this paper using data on the
whole universe of Finnish high school students spanning nine years to isolate and study
the causal eﬀects of high school choice on high stakes high school exit exam performance.
I also study the relationship of these causal eﬀects with the composition of the students'
peers. In Finland, expenditures per student vary only moderately between high schools.
This, along with the fact that Finnish 9th grade students are known to be among the
brightest on the planet in international comparisons, makes the setup exceptionally
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intriguing.
In the ﬁrst part of the analysis, I take an ancillary step in which I study the general
implications of the Finnish high school application system. I ﬁnd that, in general,
being just above the required selection threshold to their school of ﬁrst preference has a
negative causal eﬀect on student performance, although on average one gets peers that
are clearly better according to their pre-high school grades compared to the peers one
would get in the counterfactual case of being just below the threshold. In the next step,
I study each school by year observation as a separate quasi-experiment. This yields
more than 300 valid RD designs, which allow the study of the relationship between the
eﬀects on outcomes of school choice and characteristics of peers in those schools.
I answer two questions in this paper. The ﬁrst is simply whether school choice
actually has an eﬀect on exam success at the end of the high school. The negative eﬀect
at the margin found in this paper diﬀers from the majority of the literature.
The second question I tackle in this paper is whether these eﬀects stem from a
particular characteristic of the peers. In the Finnish high school system school results
are positively associated with peer homogeneity rather than average peer quality. More
precisely, I ﬁnd that a standard deviation change in the homogeneity of peers is pos-
itively associated with a 0.02 to 0.13 standard deviation change in the exam results.
The main contribution of the paper is the ﬁnding that in Finland it is the homogeneity
of the class that seems to matter for the students at the entrance threshold. This result
complements ﬁndings in other comparable studies.
According to the second result, average peer quality does not improve exam out-
comes. The hypothesis laid out in this paper is that the students that aim high on
average behave overconﬁdently in their school choices. The negative eﬀect at the mar-
gin could stem from the fact that the level of teaching is too high for those students
who just make it to their preferred school versus those who are just below the threshold
and thus end up with worse-performing peers on average. Teachers teach to the median
student and thus those at the entrance threshold don't get the optimal teaching.
In the literature, there are some previous examples of quasi-experimental designs
being used to study school performance, whether at the university level, the high school
level or an earlier stage of schooling. An early example of such a design is by Sacerdote
(2001), who exploits a randomized allocation of students to dorm rooms. He ﬁnds
that peers matter at the college level, and that better-performing peers improve school
performance. (15) examine a quasi-experimental setup, where students are allocated to
high schools partly according to a lottery. They ﬁnd little impact on academic outcomes,
but some eﬀect on other social outcomes.
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The RD design has been used by some authors. (17) study an actual experiment,
where a number of ﬁrst grade pupils were allocated to classes according to exam scores in
Kenya. They ﬁnd no eﬀect of being allocated with higher-achieving students compared
to those who were allocated with lower-achieving students. (13) examines the eﬀect
of attending selective schools from the sixth to the ninth grade. Clark discovers a
small positive eﬀect on exam scores and a stronger eﬀect on long-run outcomes such
as university attendance. (36) study intention-to-treat eﬀects in high schools. They
ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of attending a school with better-achieving peers. (26) runs an
RD analysis on a ﬂagship university and discovers a positive income eﬀect of being
treated with attending a particular ﬂagship university versus a control group that did
not attend that university.
The rest of the article is structured in the following way. Section 2 describes the
institutional setting and the data. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the methodology and estab-
lish the validity of the quasi-experiment. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7
is the conclusion.
5.2 Institutional Setting and Data Description
In Finland, there are two types of schools that provide secondary education, upper sec-
ondary schools1 and vocational schools. The application to both is conducted through
the same centralized process. The Finnish National Board of Education, which is an
agency that is subordinate to the Ministry of Education, conducts the automated allo-
cation.
Students submit a list of ﬁve ranked choices usually at the end of their ninth grade of
comprehensive schooling, which typically takes place in the year during which they turn
16 years old. The selection itself is based on the announced preferences and students'
GPAs2 according to the announced available slots in the high schools. This ensures
that the entrance threshold for a particular school changes yearly and is unpredictable
to the student. I deﬁne the threshold to be the level of GPA where the jump in the
treatment proportion is maximized. Some schools also have another threshold, which
is based on GPA and other points, which can usually be gathered via hobbies. Any
applicant that surpasses either of these thresholds is eligible. These schools are also
included by ﬁnding both criteria3.
1I use the terms upper secondary school and high school interchangeably.
2The relevant GPA is the arithmetic mean of the following subjects: mother tongue and literature,
the second national language, foreign languages, religion or education on ethics and moral history, his-
tory, citizenship education, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, health education and geography.
Grades run between 4 and 10. 4 means fail.
3However, only the academic GPA is used for purposes of describing peer characteristics.
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The choice is made randomly for those applicants that have the same GPAs to the
2nd decimal. If an applicant is awarded a place at any of the preferences, all the lower
ranked preferences become obsolete since applicants are not allowed to refuse a place in
a school in order to opt for a lower choice. In this paper, an applicant to a high school
is deﬁned to be anyone who has that particular high school as the ﬁrst choice.
The schools, however, do have some discretion in taking in a part of their students
according to other criteria. This allows them to choose some of the students with GPAs
below the oﬃcial threshold. Although this discretion is not used extensively, it slightly
complicates the analysis, and I will take this into account in the later stages of this study.
Furthermore, if the authority that organizes the schooling, such as the municipality, has
multiple schools or tracks to oﬀer, and a student is not admitted to one of them, the
organizer is allowed to oﬀer the student a place in another school or track.
During the years under scrutiny, the majority of Finland's more than 300 high
schools were owned by the local municipalities. Under a tenth of the schools were run
by private owners and 10 schools were owned by the state. Municipal schools do not
charge for the schooling. Private schools may charge small fees, but high schooling is not
allowed to be organized for proﬁt. Funding is granted by the state and municipalities
based on the number of students. Expenditures per student do vary somewhat between
schools1.
In upper secondary schools, students take courses according to their individual study
plan and aim to graduate in two to four years2. Upper secondary school and some
vocational school tracks conclude with a matriculation examination. The outcome of
interest in this study is the matriculation examination score in the Finnish language
test, since this test is taken universally by all pupils with Finnish as their mother tongue.
Also, the schools are considered at the school level without separating between tracks
within schools. This is necessary, since the data only give the school of graduation and
not the particular track. This should not aﬀect the results much, since most schools
analyzed have only one track.
The matriculation examination is organized twice a year. The student can attend
up to three examination periods. Thus, the student can spend up to 1.5 years for the
whole matriculation examination. If the student fails one or more of the exams, he or
she can make even further attempts to achieve a passing grade. The candidate has to
complete at least four tests, which make up the matriculation examination. Until 2005,
the compulsory tests were the mother tongue (usually Finnish), the second national
1Unfortunately there is data available on the Finnish schools' expenditures per student only at the
ownership level. Since for example the city of Helsinki owns many high schools, we do not know what
is the expenditure per student in each individual school is.
2Read (30) for a more comprehensive description of Finnish high schools.
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language (usually Swedish), a foreign language (usually English) and either mathematics
or general studies. Since 2005, the only compulsory test has been the candidate's mother
tongue. The tests are graded nationally by the Matriculation Examination Board.
The students are given a verbal grade with seven diﬀerent values. The grades are
normalized nationally within each matriculation period so that ideally an equal share of
students would get a particular grade1. For numerical equivalents of the verbal grades, I
will use the same convention as the Finnish National Board of Education does for some
other purposes. The verbal grades are assigned values from 7 to 0 with grade 1 missing
and 7 being the best one. In most tests, with the notable exception of the mother
tongue test, the student can choose whether to take the A-level, B-level or C-level test,
A-level being the most advanced2.
The main part of the data used in this study is combined from two administrative
registers. The application data for the years between 1996 and 2004 consist of a dataset
collected by the the Finnish National Board of Education. These data reveal among
other things the applicants' ranked high school preferences, GPAs, the ﬁnal school
choice, gender, school of origin and home address. The number of ﬁrst choice non-
vocational high school applicants for these nine years is about 300,000, or about 33,000
per year. The other part of the data consists of the matriculation examination outcomes,
which are collected by the Matriculation Examination Board. These data cover the years
between 1990 and 2010 and have grade, time and place of all the matriculation exams
taken by each student. To assign each student to a particular school, I will use the
matriculation exam data. This is due to two reasons. First, if these two diﬀer and a
student has switched schools during their high school studies, it is likely that the school
where the pupil graduated and thus probably also did his or her preparatory courses for
the matriculation exams is more inﬂuential in deﬁning their exam outcomes. Secondly,
the data about the initial school assignment appear to be missing or corrupt for some
of the schools for some years.
Only the largest schools with a minimum of 600 ﬁrst applicants in the combined
nine years are used in this study to ensure large enough sample size for the estimates.
The data and the relevant variables are described in Table 5.1. Given the strict criteria
I set for a valid year by school quasi-experiment, around 30000 pupil observations in
326 diﬀerent school by year observations are used for the main analysis.
1The grades from top to bottom and the target shares are: laudatur (5%), eximia cum laude appro-
batur (15%), magna cum laude approbatur (20%), cum laude approbatur (24%), lubenter approbatur
(20%), approbatur (11%) and improbatur (5%, a fail)
2Statistics and other information about the matriculation examination can be found in the statistics
book "Finnish Matriculation Examination 2007" (1).
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5.3 Empirical Methodology
The Finnish schooling system does not oﬀer a fully randomized setup as e.g. (37) is
able to exploit. However, the RD nature of the Finnish high school process gives us a
close approximation of a randomized experiment at the entrance threshold.
The theory, as laid out by (24) and (6), states that an RD design arises when the
treatment status depends on an observable characteristic S of the agent, where S stands
for the score. In this case S is the GPA, and the preference ranking of schools for those
with GPAs at the threshold. A second requirement is that the treatment status of the
agents or students has to jump discontinuously at a known cutoﬀ point.
In the case of a sharp RD design all the subjects above the cutoﬀ take the treatment
and below it none of them do. Let Y0 denote the outcome in the case of no treatment
and let s¯ be the cutoﬀ so that superscript minus and plus signs denote the values
right below and above it. In this rare case the only condition (Condition 1) for the
identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect is that in the counterfactual world, where no one
takes the treatment, there would be no discontinuity in the outcomes at the cutoﬀ, i.e.
E{Y0|s¯+} = E{Y0|s¯−}.
If this condition holds, we are able to identify the local average treatments eﬀect (LATE)
for the individuals immediately above the cutoﬀ, since locally we have a situation where
treatment is assigned randomly with full compliance. If the same condition holds true
for Y1, the outcome with treatment, we can identify the mean impact of extending the
programme to marginally excluded individuals.
In a fuzzy RD design the participation rate jumps by less than one. Some of the
subjects below the cutoﬀ might participate and some of them above the cutoﬀ might
not. Two additional conditions are required for this framework to achieve a clean
identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀects. One additional condition (Condition 2) says
that there is no direct eﬀect of S on the outcome for a ﬁxed treatment status in the
neighborhood of the cutoﬀ and that assignment around the cutoﬀ is as randomized.
Thus, if Y1 is the outcome with treatment, and I(s) is the binary treatment status, the
triple (Y0, Y1, I(s)) needs to be stochastically independent of S in a neighborhood of s¯.
The other additional condition (Condition 3) is that there are no deﬁers, i.e. there are
no subjects who would take the treatment below the cutoﬀ and not take it above the
cutoﬀ. If the above conditions hold, we can identify the LATE. Most years in most
schools studied in this paper do not oﬀer a sharp, but a fuzzy setup. I discuss the RD
design in more detail in the next subsection.
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An RD design is not a method, rather it is a description of a data generating
process, as (31) note. Once the RD setup is conﬁrmed to be valid, the method is a
rather straightforward means comparison or a regression analysis. The setup becomes
statistically reminiscent of a controlled experiment.
Since each school for each of the 9 years oﬀers a potential quasi-experiment, one can
be very selective ex-ante about the necessary conditions for inclusion of that particular
school/year in the study. I study only schools that have at least 600 ﬁrst applicants in all
the 9 years combined. This leaves us with 184 schools. Also, in my main speciﬁcation,
I require there to be at least 20 control subjects and 30 students in the treatment group
within an interval of 0.6 9th grade grades of the threshold. This is to ensure a decent
signal to noise ratio in the estimates.1
The statistical method itself used for the estimates is the following regression :
yi,t,k = α+ hk(Si) + x
′
iβ + x
′
2,kβ2 + x
′
3,i,kβ3 + δt,kI(Si,k ≥ s¯t,k)I(Enrolli = t) + ui,
where yi,t,k is the dependent variable, such as the matriculation examination result,
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is the pupil index for the population of ﬁrst applicants to a particular
high school, t ∈ {1996, 1997, ..., 2004} is the year of enrollment and k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
is the school of graduation. hk(Si) is the control function, a ﬁfth degree polynomial
of GPA, which is diﬀerent for each school2. x′i is a vector of yearly controls, x
′
2,k is
a vector of school controls and x′3,i,k is a vector of school by year controls. I(·) is an
indicator function, s¯t,k is the threshold for that school for that year and Enrolli stands
for the year of enrolment of the individual. The parameter of interest is δt,k, which is the
estimate of causal eﬀect for the given year for the given school. For these regressions, I
combine the data for all the analyzed schools and years. Then, I normalize the GPA to
zero at each year by school threshold.
In a ﬁrst step ancillary of the analysis, I study the whole sample for general proper-
ties of the quasi-experiment. More importantly, though, I estimate and extract school
by year estimates of the eﬀects on the matriculation examination and peer quality of
eligibility for the ﬁrst choice school using the above regression. In the second step, I
study the statistical association between school eﬀects and the statistical properties of
the peers.
1The idea behind this restriction is that in the second step of the analysis, the school by year obser-
vations are considered individual quasi-experiments. Low sample size would induce measurement error
and would attenuate the second step estimates. The band around the threshold and other speciﬁcations
are varied later for robustness checks.
2The reasoning behind a separate control polynomial for each school is that the populations are
diﬀerent, with a band around a diﬀerent threshold. Thus it is appears relevant to control for a diﬀerent
polynomial of the score variable.
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5.4 Establishing the Validity of the Randomization
In a valid regression discontinuity design, the treatment proportion has to jump at the
threshold. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 illustrate the jump in the treatment proportions
below and above the threshold as estimated with the above method. The jump is about
0.84 on aggregate for the whole sample. There are some treated subjects below the
threshold and above some of the subjects do not take the treatment.
The ﬁrst necessary condition for identiﬁcation in a fuzzy RD i.e. the condition
E{Y0|s¯+} = E{Y0|s¯−} is not testable, since we do not observe E{Y0|s¯+}. However, we
can test the continuity of other pre-treatment covariates. The remaining three diagrams
in Figure 5.1 and columns in Table 5.2 show that non-academic grades, gender and a
dummy variable about whether the pupil's home municipality is the same as the the
municipality of the school are all continuous at the 5% signiﬁcance level. In aggregate,
the variables are continuous at the threshold. Although some of these variables are
statistically signiﬁcantly non-continuous for some individual school by year observations,
this appears to be a result of randomness, not systematic.
There are a couple possible reasons as to why the ﬁrst condition would not hold.
One possibility is the presence of "gaming" at the cutoﬀ, i.e. manipulating the GPA to
get just above the cutoﬀ. This is possible but unlikely, since the annual intake quota is
a preset number1 and the number of applicants varies between years. In our sample, the
average threshold is 8.2 on a scale from 4 to 10. The lowest threshold in the sample is
7.2 and the highest threshold is 9.36. The average standard deviation of the threshold
between diﬀerent years for our sample is 0.18. Even if a pupil were able to manipulate
their 9th grade GPA to ensure that they qualify to the high school of their choice, they
would have to aim clearly above the previous year's threshold to ensure selection. Since
we are interested in the eﬀect at the threshold, their impact in our estimates should
be minimal. The kernel density estimate of applicants according to normalized GPA
is shown in Figure 5.3. There doesn't seem to be anything out of the ordinary in the
distribution of applicants just above the threshold.
Another reason why Condition 1 might not hold is the presence of attrition. Attrition
in this setup could arise from a selected part of the students just above or below the
threshold not participating in the matriculation examination. This would bias the
sample at the baseline.
An obvious feature of the setup is the fact that the schools are allowed to handpick
a small portion of the students after the oﬃcial application process and also some
1The quota itself does not vary much annually. The exact number, however, is not typically observed
by the applicant.
68
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
5.5 Results
individuals who were eligible for the treatment, actually graduate from another high
school. Due to these reasons, the DGP is not a sharp RD, but instead it is a fuzzy one.
As mentioned above, that increases the requirements for a valid quasi-experiment. The
above-mentioned third necessary condition for a fuzzy RD that requires there to be no
deﬁers, appears to be a valid assumption in our setup, especially since we only consider
the candidates that applied to that particular school as their ﬁrst choice.
The second condition imposes that assignment around the threshold take place as if
randomized. There is no guarantee that this condition holds, since one might expect that
the students who switch out of the school of ﬁrst choice are not a random sample. Even
more strongly, the students that ﬁnd a way to take the treatment even when not assigned
are most likely not a random selection. I deal with this problem in the following way.
Since I cannot be sure about the second condition, I will call my estimates intention to
treat (ITT) eﬀects and will not correct for the fact that not all of the assigned subjects
were actually treated. Thus, the causal estimate I get is simply the eﬀect of being
eligible for treatment. In other words, I estimate the eﬀect of being eligible to attend
the school of ﬁrst choice, when the control is having to attend a school of one of the
lower choices.
5.5 Results
In the ancillary step, I estimate the causal eﬀects of school choice on peer composition
and exam outcomes. I use the same regression discontinuity setup as when estimating
the continuity of covariates. The treatment is described according to the composition
of the class in terms of ninth grade GPAs. This is done by comparing the standard
deviations, mean 9th grade GPAs and mean 9th grade GPAs of the top and bottom
decile of the high school year. The absolute level of the threshold is of interest as well.
The outcome is the Finnish language mother tongue matriculation examination.
The estimation is exactly to the estimation of pre-treatment continuities. As above,
the results of these estimations are shown in Table 6.2 and Figures 6.2 and 5.4. As
the table shows, the causal eﬀect estimates for the Finnish mother tongue exam as
shown in the ﬁrst column are signiﬁcant but negative. Being eligible for attending the
school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is associated with a 0.01σ to 0.12σ change in
matriculation exam performance at the 0.95 conﬁdence level. All the other four columns
show signiﬁcant estimates for the composition of the class in terms of 9th grade GPAs
in the expected direction. These are the pre-treatment descriptions of the pupils. Thus
on average, when the pupils that are on the margin get to the school of their ﬁrst
choice, they get better and more homogeneous peers, but they do slightly worse than
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by attending the control schools. This is a surprising result and clearly in contrast with
a large portion of the literature.
This result could stem from the fact that teachers aim their teaching towards the
median or average students. As the students who just make it to their preferred school
are at the bottom of the class according to 9th grade GPAs, they end up worse oﬀ on
average than the comparable students who attend a school lower in their preferences.
Assuming that the students choose particular schools in order to achieve the best possi-
ble matriculation examination results, the working hypothesis put forth here is that at
least a subset of the students who make their school choices behave in an overconﬁdent
way.
At the ancillary step, I extract the estimates for the ITT causal eﬀect of high school
selection on Finnish language mother tongue exam and the four variables describing
the peers for each of the 326 year by school observations that have at least 20 control
subjects and 30 subjects in the treatment group within the band of 0.6 grades from the
threshold. Table 6.4 shows the descriptive statistics for these estimated observations.
In the second step, the causal eﬀect estimates are compared to the estimated class
composition variables. Table 6.5 shows the correlations between these 5 variables and
the absolute level of the entrance threshold for the school by year observation. The
class homogeneity as measured by the standard deviation of the 9th grade GPAs of
the class and the mean 9th grade GPA of the top 10% of the peers have the strongest
correlation with the estimated causal eﬀects. Mean GPA of peers is highly correlated
with the other class composition variables and the entrance threshold level.
Figure 6.5 shows the scatter plots of the estimates for the causal eﬀect on exam
performance with respect to the other ﬁve variables. Evidently, the four variables
describing the statistical properties of the class composition seem to have some outliers,
the relationships seem quite linear and class homogeneity as proxied by peer GPA
standard deviations seems to be relevant in explaining the eﬀects. The black dots
are signiﬁcant estimates at the 0.1 signiﬁcance level. 17.2% of the observations are
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
Since the data is pooled from nine diﬀerent years and 184 schools and there is an
unbalanced number of observations from each year and school, one should control for
each year eﬀects to sift out the true estimate for the linear relationship between the
variables. Table 6.6 shows the results in regression analysis framework. The table
shows the results with and without the yearly control dummies. The lower half of the
table shows the results from the exact same analysis with weights in the second stage
for the size of the control group. This is to correct for possible inaccurate estimates
of the ﬁrst stage with small control groups. It appears that of the class composition
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variables, class homogeneity as measured as the standard deviation of 9th grade peer
GPAs is the most signiﬁcant variable.
The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect of -0.53 means that a σ change in the standard
deviations of the class 9th grade GPAs is associated with a 0.02σ to 0.13σ change
in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level. Interestingly, peer mean
GPA doesn't have a signiﬁcant statistical association with the causal eﬀects in any of
the speciﬁcations.
Table 6.7 indicate regressions where multiple class composition variables are inserted
as explanatory variables. These regressions show that indeed class homogeneity seems
to have a robust statistical association with the causal eﬀect even when controlled for
other class composition variables, many of which are highly correlated with one another
as shown in Table 6.5. The high correlations make it diﬃcult to discern the statistical
eﬀects.
Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show results from robustness checks with a band of 0.2
and 0.6 around the threshold with diﬀerent third, ﬁfth and seventh degree control poly-
nomials. The results stay unchanged with respect to class homogeneity especially once
we use the ﬁfth and seventh degree speciﬁcations in the control polynomial. However, in
some speciﬁcations of the robustness check as shown in the appendix peer mean quality
becomes positive and signiﬁcant as an explanatory variable to exam performance.
5.6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to assess whether peer eﬀects in high school are signiﬁcant in
deﬁning success in high stakes school exit exams in Finland. Although Finland oﬀers a
relatively egalitarian setting for high school students at least in terms of expenditures
per student and student quality before high school, the result from this paper is that
school choice does matter and that it appears to stem partly from class composition.
Surprisingly, the evidence suggests that on average the students who are at the thresh-
old are worse oﬀ getting in to their favored school than the control group that just
missed their ﬁrst preference, although the former group gets better-achieving and more
homogenous peers on average. I propose the working hypothesis that the high-aiming
applicants might actually be overconﬁdent in the application process. They apply for a
school that will be ultimately harmful for them, since the teaching is aimed at students
that are on average better-achieving.
The main contribution of this paper, however, is to show that the homogeneity of the
class is robustly associated with the exit exam results of the students. The association
between results and average peer quality so often explored is rather more vague in the
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Finnish setting. A standard deviation change in the homogeneity of peers is positively
associated with a 0.02 to 0.13 standard deviation change in the exam results. The
association between results and homogeneity is little explored and thus these results
suggest avenues for future peer eﬀect research.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics.
Mean S.D. Min Max n
Individual level
9th grade GPA 8.23 1 4 10 205696
Finnish mother tongue 0.87 0.33 0 1 205894
matriculation exam taken
Finnish mother tongue 4.39 1.26 0 7 179966
matriculation exam grade
Mean 9th grade GPA 8.26 0.37 7.02 9.65 182257
of high school peers
Standard deviation of 9th grade 0.73 0.13 0.19 1.52 182255
GPA of high school peers
Mean 9th grade GPA of top 9.43 0.26 7.38 10 182257
10% high school peers
Mean 9th grade GPA of bottom 6.99 0.54 5.23 9.42 182257
10% high school peers
Sex (female = 1) 0.56 0.50 0 1 205892
Municipality of residence same 0.44 0.50 0 1 161116
as municipality of school
GPA of non-academic grades: 8.54 0.88 5 10 58063
music
GPA of non-academic grades: 8.42 0.83 5 10 58069
household care
GPA of non-academic grades: 8.48 0.84 5 10 58166
visual arts
GPA of non-academic grades: 8.40 0.81 4 10 58065
handicraft
GPA of non-academic grades: 8.58 0.95 4 10 58504
physical education
School level
Applicants 1118.99 434.19 600 2534 184
School by year level
Applicants 124.71 54.19 25 418 1651
Applicants for valid 181.13 56.46 85 418 326
quasi-experiments
No. of years 4.13 2.26 1 9 326
Note: This table describes those Finnish high school applicants that applied in the years 19962004 to the sample of Finnish
speaking schools with 600 or more ﬁrst applicants in aggregate for those years.
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Table 5.2: Treatment proportion and continuity of pre-treatment variables.
Dependent variable Treatment status Gender (female = 1) School of matriculation exam Non-academic grades:
in home town music
I(S > Thres) 0.843*** -0.027* 0.022 0.023
(0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.027)
n 30478 30478 26034 30119
Dependent variable Non-academic grades: Non-academic grades: Non-academic grades: Non-academic grades:
household chores visual arts handicraft physical education
I(S > Thres) 0.024 -0.011 0.053**† 0.119***††
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
n 30131 30179 30138 30332
Note: Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each column is a separate regression with a diﬀerent dependent variable. The
control variables are school ﬁxed eﬀects, yearly ﬁxed eﬀects, school by year ﬁxed eﬀects and a school-speciﬁc ﬁfth degree
polynomial control polynomial of score variable. The key independent variable is a dummy for whether the student was eligible
to attend the school of his or her ﬁrst choice.
†An estimate of 0.053 means that being eligible for attending the school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is associated with a
0.03σ to 0.11σ increase in 9th grade handicraft score at the 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††An estimate of 0.119 means that being eligible for attending the school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is associated with a
0.07σ to 0.19σ increase in 9th grade physical education score at the 0.95 conﬁdence level.
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5.6 Conclusions
Figure 5.1: Treatment status of applicants and continuity of covariates.
Note: The dashed line is the 95 % conﬁdence band. The horizontal dashed lines represent the band used in the main regressions.
The ﬁtted line represents two separate polynomial functions of the score variable for each side of the threshold. The treatment
status jumps by an estimated 84% at the threshold. The pre-treatment variables are continuous at the 95% conﬁdence level.
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Figure 5.2: Treatment status of applicants and continuity of covariates.
Note: The dashed line is the 95 % conﬁdence band. The horizontal dashed lines represent the band used in the main regressions.
The ﬁtted line represents two separate polynomial functions of the score variable for each side of the threshold. The pre-treatment
variables are continuous at the 95% conﬁdence level.
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Figure 5.3: Kernel estimate of the density function of ﬁrst applicants and the threshold.
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Note: The function used to estimate the density function is the Gaussian kernel function. The bandwidth used is the default
one in R statistical package and suggested by Silverman's "rule of thumb"(38). The x-axis depicts the GPAs normalized to the
annual threshold level.
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Figure 5.4: Matriculation examination performance.
Note: The y-axis depicts the exam performance of the students in the Finnish language matriculation examination. The x-
axis depicts the GPAs normalized to the annual threshold level. The dashed line is the 95 % conﬁdence band. The horizontal
dashed lines represent the band used in the main regressions. The ﬁtted line represents two separate polynomial functions of the
score variable for each side of the threshold. With the main speciﬁcation, the matriculation examination results are statistically
signiﬁcantly worse above the threshold than below.
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Figure 5.5: Description of treatment versus control in terms of class composition variables.
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Diagram 5: Peer median GPA
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Diagram 6: Dif. of peer median GPA to threshold
N = 52620
Note: The y-axes depict the statistical properties of the GPA of the year by school peers of each student. The x-axis depicts
the GPAs normalized to the annual threshold level. The dashed line is the 95 % conﬁdence band. The horizontal dashed lines
represent the band used in the main regressions. The ﬁtted line represents two separate polynomial functions of the score variable
for each side of the threshold. All these class composition variables are non-continuous at the threshold for the whole sample.
79
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
5. DO PEERS MATTER IN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND HOW?
EVIDENCE FROM A FINNISH HIGH SCHOOL QUASI-EXPERIMENT
Table 5.3: Estimated eﬀects from being eligible for treatment.
Panel A: Peer Description
Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade GPA Peer 9th grade top 10% Peer 9th grade bottom 10%
mean GPA standard deviation mean GPA
I(S > Thres)†† 0.396*** -0.044*** 0.245*** 0.386***
0.008 0.003 0.007 0.011
n 30349 30349 30349 30349
Peer Median Distance between Peer
GPA Median GPA and Threshold
I(S > Thres)††† 0.426*** 0.100***
0.009 0.006
n 30349 30349
Panel B: Outcome Variables
Mother tongue, All exams, Number of exams Economics and statistics
Finnish average passed entrance criteria points
I(S > Thres) -0.078**† 0.040 0.019 -0.155
(0.034) (0.029) (0.044) (0.272)
n 30478 30478 30450 23937
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each column is a separate regression with a
diﬀerent dependent variable. The control variables are school ﬁxed eﬀects, yearly ﬁxed eﬀects, school by year ﬁxed eﬀects and a
school-speciﬁc ﬁfth degree polynomial control polynomial of score variable. The key independent variable is a dummy for
whether the student was eligible to attend the school of his or her ﬁrst choice.
†An estimate of -0.078 means that being eligible for attending the school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is associated with a
0.01σ to 0.12σ change in matriculation exam performance at the 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††The estimates in this column mean that being eligible for attending the school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is
associated with a 0.81σ to 0.87σ, 0.28σ to 0.37σ, 0.71σ to 0.80σ and 0.55σ to 0.62σ change in the respective class composition
variables at the 0.95 conﬁdence level in order from ﬁrst to last column.
†††The estimates in this column mean that being eligible for attending the school of ﬁrst preference at the threshold is
associated with a 0.82σ to 0.89σ and 0.38σ to 0.48σ change in the respective class composition variables at the 0.95 conﬁdence
level in order from ﬁrst to last column.
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics, second step.
Mean S.D. Min Max n
Estimated causal eﬀect -0.06 0.43 -1.13 1.51 326
Entrance threshold level 8.14 0.40 7.20 9.36 326
Diﬀerence in peer mean 0.38 0.21 -0.25 0.94 326
9th grade GPA
Diﬀerence in peer top 10% 0.23 0.19 -0.53 0.74 326
mean 9th grade GPA
Diﬀerence in peer bottom 10% 0.38 0.37 -0.72 1.45 326
mean 9th grade GPA
Diﬀerence in peer 9th grade 0.38 0.37 -0.72 1.45 326
GPA standard deviation
Diﬀerence in peer 9th 0.41 0.24 -0.44 1.16 326
grade median GPA
Distance between peer median 0.11 0.20 -0.39 0.71 326
GPA and Threshold
Note: This table gives the descriptive statistics for the estimates of the year by school causal eﬀects at the margin of school
eligibility on Finnish language mother tongue matriculation examination and four class composition variables. In addition it
describes the entrance threshold levels. All the class composition variables range from negative to far in the positive values.
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Figure 5.6: Peer description and causal eﬀect estimates.
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Diagram 1: Peer mean GPA
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Diagram 2: Peer GPA standard deviations
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Diagram 3: Top 10% peer mean GPA
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Diagram 4: Bottom 10% peer mean GPA
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Diagram 5: Entrance threshold
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Diagram 6: Dist. between peer median GPA 
 and threshold
Note: 326 data points in each ﬁgure. These estimates are extracted from the main speciﬁcation with a ﬁfth degree polynomial
and with at least 20 school by year control subjects and a treatment group of at least 30 treated subjects at a 0.6 band from the
threshold. The black dots are estimates of the causal eﬀect of the treatment school that are signiﬁcant at the 0.1 signiﬁcance
level. 17.2% of the estimates are signiﬁcant at the 0.1 signiﬁcance level, 10.4% at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level and 3.7% at the 0.01
signiﬁcance level.
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5.6 Conclusions
Table 5.6: Regression analysis, second step.
Panel A: Non-weighted
Entrance Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade
threshold mean GPA top 10% bottom 10% GPA standard deviation
0.12** 0.1*† -0.14 -0.12 -0.31** -0.29**†† 0.06 0.06 -0.58** -0.53**†††
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.28) (0.27)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree control polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
in the ancillary step
Peer 9th grade Distance between peer
median GPA median GPA and
entrance threshold
-0.19 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Fifth degree control polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
in the ancillary step
Panel B: Weighted
Entrance Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade Peer 9th grade
threshold mean GPA top 10% bottom 10% GPA standard deviation
0.11** 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.2 -0.18 0.08 0.08 -0.47** -0.48**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.24)
Weighted by the control group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
size in the ancillary step
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree control polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
in the ancillary step
Peer 9th grade Distance between peer
median GPA median GPA and
entrance threshold
-0.08 -0.05 -0.18 -0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Weighted by the control group Yes Yes Yes Yes
size in the ancillary step
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree control polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
in the ancillary step
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The school by year sample size is 326. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the estimated causal
eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The band is 0.6. The sample contains only schools with
more than 20 control subjects and 30 subject in the treatment group within the band. The number of student observations in
valid school by year combinations is 30349. The diﬀerent degrees of polynomials indicate the degree of school individual control
polynomial of the score variable used in the ancillary step estimate the eﬀects.
†An estimate of 0.1 for the threshold level means that a standard deviation change in the threshold level is associated with a 0σ
to 0.08σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††An estimate of -0.29 for the threshold level means that a standard deviation change in the threshold level is associated with a
0.01σ to 0.15σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
†††The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect in standard deviation with yearly ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬁfth degree polynomial of -0.53 means
that a σ change in the standard deviations of the class is associated with a 0.02σ to 0.13σ change in matriculation exam
performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
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5. DO PEERS MATTER IN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND HOW?
EVIDENCE FROM A FINNISH HIGH SCHOOL QUASI-EXPERIMENT
Table 5.7: Regressions, second step, band of 0.6, at least 20 controls, multiple explanatory
class composition variables, weighted by control group size.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Peer mean 9th -0.15 -0.15 -0.29*
grade GPA (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Top 10% peer mean -0.17 -0.15 -0.24 -0.3** -0.28** -0.38**
9th grade GPA (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Bottom 10% peer mean 0.13** 0.13** 0.14*
9th grade GPA (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Peer 9th grade GPA -0.62** -0.63** -0.8** -0.44* -0.45* -0.46
standard deviation (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29)
Weighted by the control group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
size in the ancillary step
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. The dependent variable is the estimated
causal eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The school by year sample size is 326. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The band is 0.6. The sample contains only
schools with more than 20 control subjects and 30 subject in the treatment group within the band. The number of student
observations in valid school by year combinations is 30349. Class homogeneity retains its explanatory power even when other
class composition variables are used in the same regression. The speciﬁcations were chosen in the manner that would not use
two explanatory variables with more than 0.5 correlation between each other in the same regression. The degree of polynomial
indicates the degree of polynomial used in the ﬁrst stage to estimate the eﬀects.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7 Appendix
Table 5.8: Regressions, second step, band of 0.6, at least 20 controls
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Entrance threshold 0.13** 0.11* 0.07 0.12** 0.1*† 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer mean 9th -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.21 -0.17 -0.15 -0.2
grade GPA (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Top 10% peer mean -0.19 -0.17 -0.24 -0.31** -0.29**†† -0.37** -0.34** -0.32** -0.39**
9th grade GPA (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Bottom 10% peer mean 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09
9th grade GPA (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer 9th grade GPA -0.45* -0.45* -0.42 -0.58** -0.53**††† -0.6* -0.64** -0.65** -0.76**
standard deviation (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.27) (0.31) (0.29) (0.3) (0.35)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Fifth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The school by year sample size is 326. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the estimated causal
eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The band is 0.6. The sample contains only schools with
more than 20 control subjects and 30 subject in the treatment group within the band. The number of student observations in
valid school by year combinations is 30349. The diﬀerent degrees of polynomials indicate the degree of school individual control
polynomial of the score variable used in the ancillary step estimate the eﬀects.
†An estimate of 0.1 for the threshold level means that a standard deviation change in the threshold level is associated with a 0σ
to 0.08σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††An estimate of -0.29 for the top 10% peer mean 9th grade GPA means that a standard deviation change in the ttop 10% peer
mean GPA is associated with a 0.01σ to 0.15σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
†††The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect in standard deviation with yearly ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬁfth degree polynomial of -0.53 means
that a σ change in the standard deviations of the class is associated with a 0.02σ to 0.13σ change in matriculation exam
performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
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5. DO PEERS MATTER IN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND HOW?
EVIDENCE FROM A FINNISH HIGH SCHOOL QUASI-EXPERIMENT
Table 5.9: Regressions, second step, band of 0.6, at least 20 controls, weighted by the
number of control subjects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Entrance threshold 0.12** 0.1* 0.05 0.11** 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.05 0
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer mean 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11
9th grade GPA (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Top 10% peer mean -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 -0.2 -0.18 -0.28* -0.18 -0.17 -0.27
9th grade GPA (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Bottom 10% peer mean 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11* 0.11* 0.12
9th grade GPA (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer 9th -0.35 -0.36 -0.37 -0.47** -0.48** -0.54* -0.62** -0.62** -0.71**
grade GPA standard deviation (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.32)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The school by year sample size is 326. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the estimated causal
eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The band is 0.6. The sample contains only schools with
more than 20 control subjects and 30 subject in the treatment group within the band. The second step regression is weighted
by the number of control subjects to correct for possible problems with small sample size. The number of student observations
in valid school by year combinations is 30349. The diﬀerent degrees of polynomials indicate the degree of school individual
control polynomial of the score variable used in the ancillary step estimate the eﬀects.
†An estimate of -0.29 for the threshold level means that a standard deviation change in the threshold level is associated with a
0.01σ to 0.15σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect in standard deviation with yearly ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬁfth degree polynomial of -0.53 means
that a σ change in the standard deviations of the class is associated with a 0.02σ to 0.13σ change in matriculation exam
performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
86
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
5.7 Appendix
Table 5.10: Regressions, second step, band of 0.2, at least 10 controls
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Entrance threshold 0.104 0.096 0.062 0.087 0.087 0.011 0.098 0.095 0.013
(0.088) (0.091) (0.111) (0.091) (0.094) (0.116) (0.098) (0.101) (0.128)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer mean 0.283* 0.277* 0.284 0.331** 0.336**† 0.325* 0.332** 0.347** 0.303
9th grade GPA (0.147) (0.152) (0.182) (0.14) (0.145) (0.183) (0.149) (0.153) (0.198)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Top 10% peer mean 0.111 0.095 0.109 0.16 0.154 0.14 0.16 0.164 0.086
9th grade GPA (0.172) (0.177) (0.208) (0.165) (0.17) (0.209) (0.177) (0.181) (0.228)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Bottom 10% peer mean 0.231*** 0.24*** 0.294*** 0.279*** 0.294*** 0.324*** 0.323*** 0.336*** 0.385***
9th grade GPA (0.088) (0.09) (0.103) (0.085) (0.087) (0.104) (0.089) (0.091) (0.11)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer 9th -0.949*** -1.013*** -1.122*** -0.878** -1.163***†† -1.201*** -1.282*** -1.34*** -1.51***
grade GPA standard deviation (0.35) (0.36) (0.399) (0.369) (0.347) (0.396) (0.346) (0.357) (0.41)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The school by year sample size is 257. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the estimated causal
eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The band is 0.2. The sample contains only schools with
more than 10 control subjects and 15 treated subjects. The number of student observations in valid school by year combinations
is 10452. The diﬀerent degrees of polynomials indicate the degree of polynomial used in the ﬁrst stage to estimate the eﬀects.
†The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect in peer mean 9th grade GPA with yearly ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬁfth degree polynomial of 0.336
means that a σ change in the standard deviations of the class is associated with a 0.02σ to 0.26σ change in matriculation exam
performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††An estimate of -1.163 for the peer 9th grade GPA standard deviation means that a standard deviation change in the
homogeneity of the class is associated with a 0.06σ to 0.22σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
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5. DO PEERS MATTER IN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND HOW?
EVIDENCE FROM A FINNISH HIGH SCHOOL QUASI-EXPERIMENT
Table 5.11: Regressions, second step, band of 0.2, at least 10 controls, weighted by the
number of control subjects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Entrance threshold 0.11 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer mean 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.32* 0.44*** 0.44***† 0.38** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.34*
9th grade GPA3 (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Top 10% peer mean 0.27 0.24 0.12 0.31* 0.3* 0.17 0.33* 0.32* 0.1
9th grade GPA2 (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Bottom 10% peer mean 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.41***
9th grade GPA (0.08) (0.08) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.1)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Peer 9th -1.07*** -1.12*** -1.27*** -1.22*** -1.28***†† -1.36*** -1.41*** -1.47*** -1.66***
grade GPA standard deviation (0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.32) (0.33) (0.38) (0.33) (0.34) (0.39)
year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
school ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
third degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
ﬁfth degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
seventh degree polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The school by year sample size is 257. Signiﬁcance level: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Each
column represents a diﬀerent regression. Rows show the explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the estimated causal
eﬀect of that school by year observation for the students at the margin. The band is 0.2. The sample contains only schools with
more than 10 control subjects and 15 treated subjects. The second step regression is weighted by the number of control
subjects to correct for possible problems with small sample size. The number of student observations in valid school by year
combinations is 10452. The diﬀerent degrees of polynomials indicate the degree of polynomial used in the ﬁrst stage to estimate
the eﬀects.
†The estimated signiﬁcant eﬀect in peer mean 9th grade GPA with yearly ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬁfth degree polynomial of 0.44
means that a σ change in the standard deviations of the class is associated with a 0.07σ to 0.30σ change in matriculation exam
performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
††An estimate of -1.28 for the peer 9th grade GPA standard deviation means that a standard deviation change in the
homogeneity of the class is associated with a 0.08σ to 0.24σ change in matriculation exam performance at 0.95 conﬁdence level.
88
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
References
[1] (2009), Finnish Matriculation Examination 2007 -
Statistics from the matriculation examination board.
The Matriculation Examination Board. 65
[2] Acemoglu, D. (1998), Why do new technologies com-
plement skills? directed technical change and wage in-
equality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113,
10551089. 21
[3] Acemoglu, D. (2000), Technical change, inequality, and
the labor market. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research. 20
[4] Acemoglu, D. et al. (2011), Skills, tasks and technolo-
gies: Implications for employment and earnings. Hand-
book of Labor Economics, 4, 10431171. 20
[5] Barro, R.J. and J.W. Lee (2010), A new data set of edu-
cational attainment in the world, 19502010. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 2, 4, 8
[6] Battistin, E. and E. Rettore (2008), Ineligibles and el-
igible non-participants as a double comparison group
in regression-discontinuity designs. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 142, 715730. 66
[7] Becker, G.S., W.H.J. Hubbard, and K.M. Murphy
(2010), Explaining the worldwide boom in higher edu-
cation of women. Journal of Human Capital, 4, 203
241. 2, 3, 12, 47
[8] Card, D. and J.E. DiNardo (2002), Skill-biased techno-
logical change and rising wage inequality: Some prob-
lems and puzzles. Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 4.
47
[9] Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2000), Can falling supply
explain the rising return to college for younger men? a
cohort-based analysis. Technical report, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research. 20
[10] Charles, K.K. and M.C. Luoh (2003), Gender diﬀer-
ences in completed schooling. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 85, 559577. 47
[11] Chiappori, P.A., M. Iyigun, and Y. Weiss (2009), In-
vestment in schooling and the marriage market. The
American Economic Review, 99, 16891713. 10, 12,
33, 45, 47
[12] Cho, D. (2007), The role of high school performance
in explaining women's rising college enrollment. Eco-
nomics of Education Review, 26, 450462. 10, 45, 47,
56, 57
[13] Clark, D. (2010), Selective schools and academic
achievement. The B.E. Journal of Economic Anal-
ysis and Policy, 10:1. 63
[14] Craig, I.W., C.M.A. Haworth, and R. Plomin (2009),
Commentary on "a role for the x chromosome in sex dif-
ferences in variability in general intelligence?"(johnson
et al., 2009). Perspectives on Psychological Science,
4, 615621. 16
[15] Cullen, J.B., B.A. Jacob, and S. Levitt (2006), The ef-
fect of school choice on participants: Evidence from ran-
domized lotteries. Econometrica, 74, 11911230. 62
[16] Dougherty, C. (2005), Why are the returns to schooling
higher for women than for men? Journal of Human
Resources, 40, 969988. 12
[17] Duﬂo, E., P. Dupas, M. Kremer, L. Center, and T. Floor
(2008), Peer eﬀects and the impact of tracking: Evi-
dence from a randomized evaluation in Kenya. NBER
Working Paper. 63
[18] Ellis, H. (1894), Man and woman. Scott. 13
[19] Feingold, A. (1992), Sex diﬀerences in variability in in-
tellectual abilities: A new look at an old controversy.
Review of Educational Research, 62, 6184. 13
[20] Fortin, N.M., P. Oreopoulos, and S. Phipps (2011),
Leaving boys behind: Gender disparities in high aca-
demic achievement. Technical report, Working Paper,
Department of Economics, UBC. 56
[21] Frasier, G.W. (1919), A comparative study of the vari-
ability of boys and girls. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, 3, 151. 13
[22] Goldin, C. and L.F. Katz (2009), The race between ed-
ucation and technology: The evolution of us educational
wage diﬀerentials, 1890 to 2005. Technical report, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. 20
[23] Goldin, C., L.F. Katz, and I. Kuziemko (2006), The
homecoming of american college women: The reversal of
the college gender gap. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 20, 133156. 3, 12, 33
[24] Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. Van der Klaauw (2001),
Identiﬁcation and estimation of treatment eﬀects with
a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica, 69,
201209. 66
[25] Hedges, L.V. and A. Nowell (1995), Sex diﬀerences in
mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-
scoring individuals. Science, 269, 4145. 13, 14
[26] Hoekstra, M. (2009), The Eﬀect of Attending the Flag-
ship State University on Earnings: A Discontinuity-
Based Approach. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 91, 717724. 63
[27] Hubbard, W.H.J. (2011), The phantom gender diﬀer-
ence in the college wage premium. Journal of Human
Resources, 46, 568586. 12, 33, 47
[28] Johnson, W., A. Carothers, and I.J. Deary (2008), Sex
diﬀerences in variability in general intelligence: A new
look at the old question. Perspectives on Psychologi-
cal Science, 3, 518. 14
[29] Johnson, W., A. Carothers, and I.J. Deary (2009), A
role for the x chromosome in sex diﬀerences in variability
in general intelligence? Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 4, 598611. 16
[30] Kirjavainen, Tanja (2009), Essays on the Eﬃciency
of Schools and Student Achievement, volume 53 of
VATT Publications. Government Institute for Eco-
nomic Research, VATT. 64
89
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
REFERENCES
[31] Lee, D. and T. Lemieux (2009), Regression discontinu-
ity designs in economics. NBER working paper. 67
[32] Machin, S. and T. Pekkarinen (2008), Global sex diﬀer-
ences in test score variability. Science. 15
[33] Meara, E.R., S. Richards, and D.M. Cutler (2008),
The gap gets bigger: changes in mortality and life ex-
pectancy, by education, 19812000. Health Aﬀairs, 27,
350360. 21
[34] Nowell, A. and L.V. Hedges (1998), Trends in gender
diﬀerences in academic achievement from 1960 to 1994:
An analysis of diﬀerences in mean, variance, and ex-
treme scores. Sex Roles, 39, 2143. 14
[35] Pekkarinen, T. (2012), Gender diﬀerences in educa-
tion. forthcoming in: Nordic Economic Policy Re-
view. 1, 2, 3
[36] Pop-Eleches, C. and M. Urquiola (2008), The conse-
quences of going to a better school. Department of
Economics. Columbia University. Mimeo. 63
[37] Sacerdote, B. (2001), Peer eﬀects with random assign-
ment: Results for dartmouth roommates*. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 681704. 62, 66
[38] Silverman, B.W. (1986), Density estimation for statis-
tics and data analysis, volume 26. Chapman &
Hall/CRC. 77
90
Kanninen, Ohto (2013), Five essays on economics of education 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/93297
